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ABSTRACT 
The comparative research investigates differences between the United States and 
Azerbaijan’s applications of strategic communications to counter terrorist recruiting. 
The key differences lie in cultural and religious narratives as well as target audiences. 
The U.S. Constitution formally protects freedom of speech and freedom of religion, 
and the anti-terrorism strategic communications of the U.S. government do not 
generally target a domestic audience. Azerbaijan formally and informally protects 
historically established religious traditions, insofar as those traditions guarantee 
non-violence. This requires regulation of religious freedom by Azerbaijani policy 
makers. These differences are due not only to the religious dissimilarity between the 
countries but also to institutional legacies. Whereas the United States has 
prioritized the freedom of expression in its organization of strategic communications, 
the government of Azerbaijan has constructed narratives of multiculturalism countering 
religious radicalization. The lessons from how U.S. institutions emphasize freedom of 
expression in their strategic communications to counter terrorist recruiting may help 
Azerbaijan boost the effectiveness of its domestic propaganda. This research uses 
concepts from counterterrorism, communications, political science, history, and 
sociology, and draws from academic literature, policy documents, and media 
materials in English, Azerbaijani, and Russian. 
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The World Wars and regional conflicts of the 20th century have contributed to the 
emergence of the new realm of confrontation between people—ideas. During the two World Wars, 
in addition to their opposing armies, large states furnished themselves with narratives and 
competed for control over the dissemination of information domestically and internationally. 
Unacceptable costs of a direct military confrontation between the nuclear superpowers of the Cold 
War made a war of ideas their favored arena of global confrontation. In the course of the 20th 
century, newly emerged nation-states also attempted to use narratives targeting domestic 
audiences, pursuant to mobilization goals. Following the patterns set by the superpowers and 
smaller states, terrorists also adopted propaganda use, and in the 21st century elaborated their 
narratives with the aim of recruiting supporters. Eventually, the War on Terror, a narrative in and 
of itself, has called for large and small nation-states to apply their ideological strength in order to 
protect their populations from the contamination of ideas hostile to humanity. 
Especially after the emergence of the terrorist organization of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), the enemy changed its nature. ISIS used the inspirational power of radical ideas and 
borderless communication technologies to recruit supporters and create terrorists within nation-
states. Therefore, this thesis is concerned with these processes of organizing to counter terrorists’ 
recruitment through the application of strategic communications. The freedom of expression 
accepts promotion of radical ideas, unless they encourage committing violence. At the same time, 
democracies tend to disapprove of domestic strategic communications by governments. However, 
when terrorists’ propaganda of radicalism targets domestic audiences, governments may need to 
counter that message with their own strategic communications. Government narratives countering 
radicalization may even anchor democratic values. In fact, civil societies might eventually support 
governments’ strategic communications targeting domestic audiences to counter terrorists’ 
recruitment propaganda. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Over time, Islamic terrorists have developed more sophisticated propaganda activities 
aimed at the recruitment of new members. ISIS has stood out among other terrorist organizations 
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for its skillful use of propaganda that results in successful recruitment. The United States has 
therefore developed a range of strategic communications to counter terrorists’ propaganda. At the 
same time, the Republic of Azerbaijan has also faced the challenge of recruitment by radical 
Islamic organizations. This thesis asks how and why the United States and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan vary in their application of strategic communications in countering terrorist 
recruitment. This research highlights opportunities for governments to strengthen their 
counterterrorism policies. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Islamist terrorists have marked the Republic of Azerbaijan because of its geopolitical, 
social, and religious significance. Starting with the late 1990s, the government of Azerbaijan has 
been actively struggling against the spread of the Islamic religious radicalism, which was mainly 
introduced through the infiltration of Arab humanitarian relief organizations in the country, as well 
as stimulated by Azerbaijan’s proximity to the Northern Caucasus Islamic insurgency.1 The 
development of modern communication technologies often allows Islamic terrorist propaganda to 
reach groups of Azerbaijan’s population vulnerable to religious radicalism due to tenuous social 
conditions, weak literacy, and lack of critical thinking. During the last five years, terrorists have 
succeeded in attracting more than 900 Azerbaijani citizens to join ISIS.2 In this period, Azerbaijan 
has adopted a variety of prohibitive measures against the radical Salafi ideology and has 
simultaneously attempted to promote enlightenment concepts countering radical Islam. But Salafi 
followers continuously search for different media to spread their propaganda, and their presence 
in cyberspace has grown.3 A response to radical propaganda requires a coordination of 
communication activities, trustworthy narratives, and the participation of a wider public; yet, this 
response is not addressed systematically in the region. 
                                                 
1 Rufat Sattarov, Islam, State, and Society in Independent Azerbaijan: Between Historical Legacy and Post-
Soviet Reality with Special Reference to Baku and Its Environs (Germany, Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag, 2009), 132. 
2 Azad Hasanli and Anvar Mammadov, “Azerbaijan Checking Number of Its Women, Children in Camps in 
Iraq,” Trend, last modified October, 30, 2017, https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/society/2814504.html. 
3 Kamal Gasimov, “Multimodal Salafi Engagement with Digital Media in Azerbaijan” (CAP Papers 195, July 
2017), http://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/10835. 
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In its propaganda targeting recruitment, ISIS benefits from global supporters, as well as its 
ability to create and spread messages over wider socio-geographical borders. Western and Arab 
counterterrorism officials believe that despite the loss of territories, ISIS still preserves capabilities 
for recruiting followers around the world and is strategically using communication to inspire “lone 
wolf” terrorists.4 Brian Michael Jenkins points out that the progression from inspiration to 
radicalization, and then from recruitment to jihad, is not necessarily a whole process,5 leaving the 
opportunity for one to disengage from it. Governments’ strategic communications countering ISIS 
propaganda may be of help to disrupt terrorists’ recruitment process. 
The United States has employed strategic communications during wars and crises (such as 
the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War), but legislators dismantled these 
activities during peace because they were not confident in the people’s acceptance of the 
government’s role in such manipulative communication.6 The need to counter radical ideologies 
leading to homegrown religious extremism raised the question about the compatibility of 
government use of strategic communications domestically and the freedom of expression. 
American institutions—inter alia the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (State 
Department), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
the U.S. intelligence community, the National Security Council and others—deal with aspects of 
wider strategic communications in their specific fields of competence.7 When ISIS actively 
exploits propaganda to recruit new supporters among residents of Western countries, the correct 
response may be arranging for one specific governmental institution to coordinate strategic 
communications in countering terrorists’ propaganda.  
In Azerbaijan, policy makers have adopted a variety of legislative measures in response to 
religious radicalization. Article 18 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan states that: “religion is 
                                                 
4 Margaret Coker, Eric Schmitt, and Rukmini Callimachi, “With Loss of Its Caliphate, ISIS May Return to 
Guerrilla Roots,” New York Times, October 18, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/middleeast/islamic-state-territory-attacks.html.  
5 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism 
in the United States since 9/11” (occasional paper, RAND, 2011), 17, 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP343.html.  
6 Christopher Paul, Strategic Communications: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates (Santa Barbara, CA: 
Praeger, 2011), 79. 
7 Paul, Strategic Communications, 84–110. 
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separated from the state; propaganda of religions humiliating people’s dignity and contradicting 
the principles of humanism is prohibited; and state education system is secular.”8 Moreover, 
legislative measures include the compulsory registration of religious communities, strict regulation 
of distribution of religious materials and ban on religious propaganda of non-citizens.9 
Azerbaijan’s law enforcement agencies’ counterterrorism measures are focused on prosecutions, 
arrests, and special operations.10 Meanwhile, the State Committee on Work with Religious 
Associations conducts religious regulations, engaging the non-governmental organization (NGO) 
the Administration of the Caucasus Muslims with regard to Islam related issues. In addition to that, 
several ministries and state committees have responsibilities of disseminating inter alia narratives 
countering radicalization among particular groups of citizens, such as youth, women, sportsmen, 
students, and others. Azerbaijan has its own concept of domestic propaganda in general, but the 
application of strategic communications in countering terrorists’ recruitment propaganda is new 
for the country.  
Countering propaganda for radicalization and recruitment in its embryonic stage may 
critically contribute to overall counterterrorism activities. The multitude of Azerbaijan’s traditions 
provides a solid basis relative to the creation of wider narratives to counter Islamic radicalism. 
Yet, the lack of advanced tools of strategic communications at the disposal of its government 
represents a serious challenge in the face of ISIS’s skillful approach to its propaganda. 
The results of this research will be of use to a variety of institutions in Azerbaijan dealing 
with countering terrorism and of particular interest to those focused on countering radicalization 
and violent extremism. This research considers ethics and democratic restrictions on governments 
that target perceptions of their own populations through counterterrorist communication. 
Furthermore, the research attempts to identify ways of sharing the processes and practices related 
                                                 
8 “The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan,” Portal Azerbaijan.az, accessed March 28, 2018, 
http://azerbaijan.az/portal/General/Constitution/doc/constitution_e.pdf.  
9 According to the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan “On freedom of religious beliefs only religious literature 
and audio/video and other materials revised and marked by the state are allowed to be disseminated”; and “non-
Azerbaijani citizens are prohibited from conducting Islamic religious ceremonies and divine services” (see more at: 
http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/7649). 
10 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016—Azerbaijan, July 19, 2017, 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e45313.html. 
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to strategic communications that are possible and desirable.11 By explaining the American 
experience to the interested professional spheres in Azerbaijan, the research also contributes to 
setting a basis for the international coordination of strategic communications countering the 
propaganda of violent extremism to be beneficial for all parties involved. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The relevant literature has been assessed in order to answer the question of how and why 
the United States and Azerbaijan vary in their application of strategic communications countering 
terrorists’ recruitment. The resultant literature review presents cluster information according to the 
following themes: strategic communications and propaganda, narratives, radicalization and violent 
extremism, terrorist propaganda and countering terrorist propaganda for recruitment.  
On a general level, the literature points out that the application of strategic communications 
by governments is a legitimate policy. Furthermore, the research shows that there is no general 
approach to the institutional framework of domestic strategic communications. Moreover, 
legislators challenge strategic communications by restricting the deliberate dissemination of 
information among domestic audiences. Finally, the literature review reveals that an effective 
narrative for countering terrorist recruitment propaganda needs solid theological knowledge 
about Islam.  
1. Strategic Communications and Propaganda 
In the consulted literature, there are a number of definitions of strategic communications 
as well as attempts to replace it with military terminology. Among a variety of definitions, the 
most general one comes from James Forest, who asserts that strategic communications “refers to 
communication that is driven primarily by a strategy for influencing human thought, emotion, and 
behavior.”12 Although it encompasses a broad spectrum, this definition lacks some deeper 
understanding of strategic communications. Christopher Paul finds confusing the usage of the 
word “strategic” because it resides not only at the strategic level. On the contrary, Paul defines 
                                                 
11 Paul, Strategic Communications, 167. 
12 James J. F. Forest, “The Democratic Disadvantage in the Strategic Communications Battlespace,” Democracy 
and Security 2, no. 1 (January 2006): 78, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419160600623467. 
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strategic communications as “coordinated actions, messages, images, and other forms of signaling 
or engagement intended to inform, influence, or persuade selected audiences in support of national 
objectives.”13 He adds that coordination is needed to avoid discord, and actions are needed to 
support communication. Paul summarizes the contentious character of the debates about the 
replacement or interchangeable usage of the terms strategic communications and public 
diplomacy. He agrees with Matt Armstrong that strategic communications and public diplomacy 
have different goals; the latter is characterized by its passive approach and concerned with 
engagement and improving a particular perception.14 The White House National Framework for 
Strategic Communications defines the term quite precisely as “the synchronization of words and 
deeds and how they will be perceived by selected audiences, as well as programs and activities 
deliberately aimed at communicating and engaging with intended audiences, including those 
implemented by public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operation professionals.”15 As 
it emphasizes the role of different actors who implement the strategy, this thesis uses the White 
House’s definition. 
The concept of strategic communications developed in the shadow of conventional warfare 
and was originally intended to constitute a decisive policy in defeating an adversary. Following 
the concept’s evolution, Haroro Ingram suggests that humans historically exploited strategic 
communications as a component of warfare, though its importance has been increasing.16 He 
assumes that the nuclear era gradually made a battle of ideas between superpowers the only 
alternative to an all-destroying conflict. Both of the two superpowers recognized for themselves 
rights to target the population of the other by deliberate information. The U.S. Information and 
Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (the Smith–Mundt Act) granted that right to the U.S. State 
Department. The Soviet Union conducted sophisticated communication activities in which all the 
ideas originated from the Communist ideology, but the ones addressing foreign audiences differed 
                                                 
13 Paul, Strategic Communications, 3, 32. 
14 Paul, Strategic Communications, 75. 
15 White House, National Framework for Strategic Communications, Washington, DC, March 2010, 
https://fas.org/man/eprint/pubdip.pdf. 
16 Haroro Ingram, “A Brief History of Propaganda during Conflict: Lessons for Counter-Terrorism Strategic 
Communications,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 4 (2016), 20. http://icct.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Haroro-Ingram-Brief-History-Propaganda-June-2016-3.pdf. 
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from those intended for the Soviet Union’s own population.17 Furthermore, in 1982, President 
Ronald Reagan predicted that not military but ideological superiority would determine the winner 
of the Cold War.18 During his presidency, in 1983, the National Security Decision Directive 
outlined U.S. strategic communications as a “comprehensive strategy—integrating politico-
military, economic and information efforts.”19 The related part of the Directive is called “Political 
Action”; it highlights the importance of dominating ideological thrust and consists of exposure of 
Soviet weaknesses and prevention of Soviet propaganda. Actually, the Directive specified an ideal 
front of confrontation with the Soviet Union where the costs were not as high as in nuclear conflict, 
yet the benefits promised unconditional victory.  
In the post-Cold War period, conventional military forces faced a new adversary—
international terrorism—changing the paradigm of warfare. Within the last decade, the threats of 
homegrown extremism, pervasive propaganda, and recruitment within the United States have 
grown from “lower than [in] Western Europe” in 200920 to “the most frequent and unpredictable 
threat to the United States” in 2017.21 The propaganda of violent extremism undermines the utility 
of regular military power itself. Within the debate over the importance of countering propaganda, 
Christopher Paul argues that in order to counter violent extremism the targets’ extremist 
worldviews have to be taken into consideration.22 These goals cannot be achieved through purely 
military means. Correspondingly, strategic communications have become a part of the U.S. 
government’s wider counterterrorism policy.  
                                                 
17 Katri Pynnöniemi and András Rácz, Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in 
Ukraine (Helsinki, Finland: FIIA, 2016), http://www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/FIIAReport45_FogOfFalsehood.pdf.  
18 “Address to Members of the British Parliament,” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. June 8, 1982, last 
accessed April 7, 2018, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm.  
19 White House, U.S. Relations with the USSR, NSDD 75 (Washington, DC: White House, 1983). 
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-75.pdf.  
20 Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community, Testimony before Select Committee on Intelligence, 
U.S. Senate, February 12, 2009 (statement for the record, Danis C. Blair, Director of National Intelligence), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf. 
21 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Testimony before Select Committee on 
Intelligence, U.S. Senate, May 11, 2017 (statement for the record, Daniel R. Coats, Director of National 
Intelligence), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-
%20Final.pdf.  
22 Paul, Strategic Communications, 1. 
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Various scholars and American policy makers agree that strategic communications and 
propaganda are not the same, though they have some similarities. The National Security Decision 
Directive of 1983 distinguishes between strategic communications and propaganda by naming its 
own activity a strategy. While naming the Soviet’s propaganda, it emphasizes the negative 
meaning of the latter. There is a culturally based disagreement among scholars about whether the 
word “propaganda” has a negative or neutral meaning. Paul points out that in English-speaking 
environments it generally has a strong negative impression, while in Latin countries its meaning 
is neutral.23 However, Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell consider that the word propaganda 
has lost its neutrality.24 They describe propaganda as communication with pre-selected content, 
aimed at promoting propagandists’ attitudes. Moreover, they suggest propaganda implies 
dishonesty, manipulation of cognition, and misrepresentation, with poor or non-existent reasoning. 
Meanwhile, Thomas Johnson emphasizes the large role of propaganda in information operations 
by stating that it is a “specific type of message aimed directly at influencing opinions of people, 
rather than impartially providing information.”25 Scholars agree that propaganda is about 
manipulation of information. Paul cites Dennis Murphy, who also says that propaganda selects 
information with little concern for truth or context, and communication activities do not by 
themselves constitute propaganda.26  He further summarizes a variety of scholars arguing that 
manipulating or lying, both of which may be a characteristic of propaganda, undermine the 
credibility of the communicator. The weakness of propaganda is that it is usually based on 
falsifications and manipulation. Arguably, the separation of propaganda from strategic 
communications becomes possible based on judgments about whether the information is true or 
false. During a conflict, judgments may be conflicting as well, eventually leading to naming one 
government’s activity as strategic communications while the adversary’s propaganda. In this case, 
a narrative targeting own audiences can easily argue that the adversary’s propaganda is doomed to 
distrust just as its roots are revealed. 
                                                 
23 Paul, Strategic Communications, 44. 
24 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2015), 
2–3, 7. 
25 Thomas Johnson, Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories In The Afghanistan Conflict (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2017), 35. 
26 Paul, Strategic Communications, 28, 46. 
 9 
In Azerbaijan, unlike the United States, the term “strategic communications” has no real 
meaning. In Azerbaijani, the term təbliğat27 is used to explain the spread of ideas among people. 
It carries a neutral meaning and is most literally translated into English as popularization or 
propaganda.28 Thus, for Azerbaijan, the broader definition of propaganda is appropriate, such as 
“honest and forthright communication intended to advance a cause through enlightenment, 
persuasion, or a dedicated sense of mission,” and “propaganda is legitimate persuasion.”29 The 
governmental institutions of Azerbaijan use təbliğat to describe their promotion of Azerbaijani 
culture, the promotion of tourism in Azerbaijan, or the propaganda of patriotism among youth.  
In terms of how to make strategic communications successful, the literature indicates few 
approaches. Ingram defines four principles of successful strategic communications campaigns: 
• Produces a diversity of messaging that leverages rational- and identity-choice 
appeals, which are deployed both defensively and offensively (with an emphasis on 
the latter); 
• Consists of messaging held together by some core themes or, ideally, a grand 
narrative; 
• Uses various means of communication to maximize the message’s reach, 
timeliness, and targeting; 
• Is calibrated to maximize the desired effects of one’s own strategic-policy/politico-
military efforts and nullify the effects of the adversary’s activities. 30 
Another point of success is noticed by Murphy who cautions not to confuse strategic 
communications with interaction with media only; he states that there are several forms of 
                                                 
27 Təbliğat can be most closely spelled in English as Teblighat. 
28 Azerbaijani Explanatory dictionary, s.v. “təbliğat,” accessed March 20, 2017, 
https://azerdict.com/english/təbliğat.  
29 Bertrand Canfield and Frazier Moore, Public Relations: Principles, Cases, and Problems (Homewood, IL: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1973), 41. 
30 Ingram, “A Brief History of Propaganda during Conflict,” 35–36. 
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communications, including words, pictures, and deeds.31 Nonetheless, the measurement of 
successful strategic communications is controversial, and the literature consulted does not offer a 
unified vision of an achieved consensus.  
2. Narratives
The definition of narratives is broad and includes features specific to their understanding 
in line with various disciplines and occupations. In his book, Taliban Narratives, Johnson 
touches how differently writers; screenwriters; scholars in anthropology, communication, and 
psychology; military professionals; and eventually terrorists understand the concepts of 
narrative and stories. The following includes the most important features of a narrative with 
regard to this thesis: “narratives are an important arsenal of cultural ammunition that helps 
to cultivate doctrine supporting morale and spirit”; “narratives are stories that reflect 
foundational beliefs that articulate a group’s views toward the world”; “narrative is a scheme by 
means of which human beings give meaning to their experience of temporality and personal 
actions”; “narratives may embody basic dogmas that clearly frame a group’s opinion on a 
matter”; “narrative is a system of stories that hang together and provide a coherent view of the 
world,” and “if shared orally, narratives may reach the literate and illiterate.”32 Moreover, 
Cristina Archetti summarizes several scholars who point out that narratives are “the means 
through which people connect their past and present together,” and “narratives were central to 
the construction of identity.”33 The better understanding of various aspects of a narrative’s 
definition may help in its tailoring to a target audience and is necessary for its effective use 
in a war of ideas against religious radicalization and violent extremism. 
Naturally, narratives are important in several aspects of terrorist activity as well. So, 
scholars have examined ways to counter terrorist organizations with the help of narratives. For 
instance, research has found that ISIS adjusted images from contemporary popular culture, video 
31 Dennis Murphy, “The Trouble with Strategic Communications(s)” (issue paper 2–08, Center for Strategic 
Leadership, 2008), 1–2, https://csl.armywarcollege.edu/usacsl/publications/IP2-
08TheTroubleWithStrategicCommunication(s).pdf. 
32 Johnson, Taliban Narratives, 2017, 2–3, 8. 
33 Cristina Archetti, “Narrative Wars: Understanding Terrorism in the Era of Global Interconnectedness,” in 
Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and International Relations, ed. Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and 
Laura Roselle (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018), 221. 
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games, and films to its narratives targeting a young global audience with the aims of recruitment.34 
Furthermore, scholars recognize the effectiveness of the Taliban’s narratives aiming at the 
recruitment of supporters.35 At the same time, the terrorist organization needs effective narratives 
to inspire those who are already members. For example, Lawrence Freedman insists on the 
importance of radical Islam’s narratives in holding terrorist cells together.36 As he suggests, a good 
understanding of a narrative may help to undermine it and thus to unbind radical groups. With 
regard to countering the Taliban’s narratives, Johnson suggests using narratives from the Pashtuns’ 
traditions, which could deprive terrorists of the rural population’s support.37 He proposes a concept 
of engaging in an ideological struggle between moderate and radical Islamists, as well as studying 
the Taliban’s vulnerabilities in order to work on a strategy to counter radical Islamic narratives in 
a different part of the world. Paul would agree by saying that to use (or compete with) narratives, 
one has to consider the prevailing cultural narratives, understandings, and descriptions of various 
events.38 Similarly, Javier Lesaca, after evaluating some successful U.S. strategic communications 
campaigns, proposes that narratives countering ISIS propaganda should anchor the authentic 
Islamic stories.39 In a war of ideas against terrorism, governments require a better fundamental 
examination of an adversary’s narratives to find their weaknesses and an effective elaboration 
of own. 
Depending on the goals of strategic communications a narrative might be of a different 
nature. Paul calls the spreading of one’s own narratives fundamentally positive strategic 
communications, while he regards the countering of an adversary’s narratives as fundamentally 
negative.40 He states that pursuing different goals requires diverse tools. Indeed, strategic 
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Brookings Institution, September 24, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/09/24/on-social-media-
isis-uses-modern-cultural-images-to-spread-anti-modern-values/.  
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communications to counter radical Islamic propaganda requires trustworthy and offensive 
narratives, anchoring the target audience’s worldview. There were periods in 2001, for instance, 
when the randomness of al-Qaeda’s messages caused uncertainty among its strategists and other 
members over what concerns were influencing the aims of the terrorist organization.41 This was 
an opportunity of when governments could have weakened terrorist organizations by spreading 
narratives countering al-Qaeda’s narratives. Moreover, as Kurt Braddock and John Horgan argue, 
there is no consistent scholarly work on the theory of construction of counter-narratives.42 
Narratives countering those of terrorists exist in Islam and various cultural traditions. Theological 
debates or opposing traditions to radicalism are some directions for finding and enforcing 
narratives countering terrorists’ propaganda.   
3. Radicalization and Violent Extremism 
Radicalization is another term having a variety of definitions. In the interests of strategic 
communications, this thesis favors the perspective that separates radicalization from extremism. 
For example, Carolin Görzig and Khaled Al-Hashimi define radicalization as “the process of 
progressively adopting more radical beliefs and ideas of Islam.”43 They stress that it is definitely 
related to terrorist acts. Meanwhile, radical Islam, according to Mohammed Hafez, has two direct 
attributes: it targets establishment of an Islamic state and presumes that terrorism or other forms 
of violence are the only justified means for that goal.44 Ideas of Islamic resurgence acquired 
methods of political violence during a process which lasted several decades. Each stage 
of the evolution of radical Islamic ideology had its specific input toward the final result. At the 
same time, Ihsan Bal places extra emphasis on the individual’s radicalization as a process of 
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Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, ed. Patrick H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 2012), 377. 
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Reduce Support for Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 5 (2016): 382, 
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43 Carolin Görzig and Khaled Al-Hashimi, Radicalization in Western Europe (New York: Routledge, 2015), 2. 
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identity building that consists of several stages.45 He stresses that this personal evolution is critical 
for terrorism; thus, radicalization has to be deeply understood as a process by those seeking to 
prevent terrorism. These definitions leave room for tolerating people with radical ideology in their 
initial evolutionary stage. Furthermore, it is necessary in order to target them with counter-
radicalizing narratives. 
Meanwhile, approaches to radicalization vary in different countries. The chairman of the 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Rob Portman, points out that in contrast to a predominantly group 
radicalization in Europe, in the United States, radicalization is occurring mainly individually 
through the influence of jihadist media content.46 The French Inter-ministerial Committee for the 
Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalization defines radicalization as “a process by which an 
individual or a group adopts a violent form of action directly linked to an extremist ideology with 
a political, social or religious content that disputes political, social or cultural order.”47 Enforcing 
the European group approach to radicalization, Jacquelien van Stekelenburg and Bert 
Klandermans argue that “radicalization” is “a collective intergroup process.”48 A group or socially 
constructed reality is necessary for radicalization. David R. Mandel attempts to define it simply as 
a progressive transformation in the degree of extremism expressed by an individual or group.49 
This makes radicalization a form of extremism and thus outlaws people with radical ideas, who 
did not commit any crime and could not be persecuted. Even though radicalized individuals do not 
                                                 
45 Ihsan Bal, “Introduction: Why a Multi-Faceted Approach to Radicalization in Terrorist Organizations?” in 
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necessarily commit crimes, they constitute the key recruitment audience when jihadists promote 
homegrown terrorism in both the United States and Europe.50 
Finally, the question of the relationship between radicalization and a terrorist act is one 
where scholars cannot come to a general conclusion. Görzig and Al-Hashimi ask how cognitive 
radicalization is related to behavior.51 They advocate that focusing only on behavioral 
radicalization is not enough as terrorism can be understood in social and political contexts. Fathali 
M. Moghaddam considers the path from radicalization to terrorist act to be a staircase where an 
individual gradually adopts the only possible choice of destruction.52 He argues that recruitment 
is one of the most important steps in the whole process that follows the adoption of terrorism as a 
strategy. In the stage of recruitment, an individual’s worldview is limited to a simplistic 
categorization that helps him to justify the next step, which is preparation for a terrorist act. Even 
though radicalization usually anticipates recruitment, in some cases individuals adopt extremist 
ideas as a result of joining a criminal group.53 Yet this can hardly be widespread, because terrorists 
usually operate deeply underground and accept members from those supporting their radical 
ideology and who have proved their support through acts of violence. 
Policy makers and scholars have devised with several approaches to understanding Islamic 
radicalization, all of which share an understanding that radicalization is the key precursor to 
violence. What makes Salafi radicalization in Azerbaijan interesting for scholars is the presence 
of variations of Salafi followers as purists, politicos, and jihadists.54 But at the same time, purists, 
who function openly, cautiously oppose politicizing Salafism and demonstrate hostility to 
jihadism. The context of Azerbaijan pushes purists to accentuate their loyalty to the state and 
condemn jihadism using narratives of global Salafism. These specifics may help uncover the 
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process by which radicals become jihadists and may contribute to finding gaps where the process 
of radicalization to recruitment may be broken. 
4. Terrorist Propaganda  
Propaganda has become an ever-growing tool of terrorists. Brigitte Nacos suggests that the 
definition of terrorism must include their communication activities.55 The communication-related 
goals of terrorists include heightening public attention, a recognition of demands, the fostering of 
sympathy, and eventually legitimacy. It is sympathy that draws individuals to terrorist cells. Susan 
Carruthers would agree, saying that a fundamental part of terrorists’ weaponry includes not only 
the need to communicate a fear but also the need through media to publicize their demands and 
spread their propaganda.56 Governments may need to publicly relay the brutality of terrorists in 
order to justify the hard measures taken against them. She stresses that messages transmitted by 
violence also contribute to attracting adherents to terrorism. In his turn, Freedman points to a 
combination of al-Qaeda’s fundamentalist nature in religious matters with its readiness to utilize 
the latest communication technologies for the sake of propaganda.57 The scholars agree overall 
that terrorists place high importance on propaganda. 
Because of the importance of propaganda for terrorists, they have exploited communication 
technologies in order to spread their stories and images from Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, or 
Kashmir. This strategy has allowed them not to just inspire supporters residing in Western Europe 
or the United States, but also to train newcomers in all aspects of terrorist activities, including 
bomb-making. Forest explains that the closing of the terrorist facilities in Afghanistan (as a result 
of successful ground battles) pushed terrorist organizations to the Internet, where they organized 
remote training camps.58 Indeed, Freedman states that within four years after 9/11, the number 
of jihadist websites increased more than 300 times; subsequently in 2005, the letter of 
al-Zawahiri declared that more than half of terrorist battles would, from that time onwards, take 
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place in media space.59 Ingram would agree; the physical destruction of al-Qaeda’s leadership did 
not stop like-minded terrorists such as ISIS from placing propaganda at the core of their complex 
policies.60 There is a consensus among authors that terrorists also pay great attention to 
communication technologies. 
ISIS defectors claim that the terrorist organization emphasizes propaganda activities in 
support of the recruitment of new fighters, and generally, the organization aims at commanding a 
global audience.61 Indeed, there is an interaction: propaganda furthered the recruitment of new 
terrorists who conducted terror acts far beyond the so-called Caliphate’s borders; the appearances 
of these terrorists, along with subsequent messages, were used in enhancing propaganda. For 
example, Lesaca states that in 2014–2015, ISIS was releasing more than one audio-video message 
every day.62 He points out that they largely utilized social media because it allowed them to reach 
individuals directly and make terror popular. Moreover, the Washington Post cites a security 
official from Morocco who insisted that online propaganda of ISIS motivated the majority of 
recruits from his country.63 In 2014, almost one in five of the 46,000 ISIS-supporting Twitter 
accounts selected English as the primary language.64 In 2016, during hearings in the U.S. 
Congress, it was confirmed that approximately 30,000 foreign fighters had joined ISIS with the 
help of its propaganda, and a new tendency to recruit citizens via social media to commit acts of 
terror in the Western countries had been observed by then.65 As radicalization is the premise for 
recruitment, a government’s activities to stop recruitment have to consider homegrown 
radicalization. 
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5. Countering Terrorist Recruitment Propaganda  
Seeking an answer to the question of how to challenge recruitment by countering terrorist 
propaganda seems worthwhile for developing an understanding of counterterrorism. Portman 
identified the three core elements of the strategy the United States needed in order to oppose 
radicalization as “exposing the enemy’s lies, countering its false narratives, and encouraging 
credible voices to tell the truth to those most susceptible or receptive to the ISIS lies.”66 These 
elements essentially are based on the idea of changing people’s behavior through a dissemination 
of information. To intervene and prevent radicalization in the United States, the Department of 
Homeland Security’s Office of Community Partnerships conducts its activities of Countering 
Violent Extremism (CVE).67 Meanwhile, during 2010–2016, the State Department’s Center for 
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, and after 2016 the State Department’s Global 
Engagement Center, dealt with countering extremist ideology.68 The concept of the Global 
Engagement Center’s activities was to prevent individuals from turning their violent beliefs into 
actions.69 It is easy to recognize that the U.S. government agencies have already furnished 
themselves with strategic communications in countering terrorists’ propaganda for recruitment. 
On the other hand, governments have capabilities to block the dissemination of undesirable 
ideas (prohibit literature, censor mass media, close accounts in social media) and by using these 
methods may attempt to disrupt terrorists’ propaganda. Nacos says that even if governments block 
terrorists’ direct propaganda through printed media or social networks, terrorists may find another 
medium.70 Terrorists are not responsible for promoting values of freedom, but democratic 
governments are. When a government blocks information, it may cause concerns about 
suppressing freedom. Jowett and O’Donnell argue in favor of allowing publicity for negative 
information, including information terrorist propaganda can use because public confidence in 
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media within an open society is important.71 This is a natural “disadvantage of democracy” for 
strategic communications.72 Not only is censorship antithetical to democracy, but also open 
societies are generally resistant to governments’ attempts to influence people’s behavior by using 
information. 
One way or another, the discussion about countering propaganda is linked to the notion of 
public trust in the government institutions in charge of it. The history of strategic communications 
in the United States demonstrates that a lack of public support for institutions whose main task 
was the dissemination of information resulted in their dismantling.73 In 2002, the U.S. government 
faced severe criticism after media revealed information about a clandestine structure inside the 
Department of Defense that dealt with shaping the informational environment.74 Arguably, the 
secrecy caused suspicions about the false information government might want to disseminate. 
Another example is that during the first two years of its existence, the U.S. Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications had purposely avoided posting materials in English so as not 
to run afoul of the Smith–Mundt Act, barring American administrations from activities to influence 
American citizens.75 Yet all this time the propaganda of Salafi extremism in English had targeted 
and influenced American residents. Ingram fairly states that even though persuasion is a feature of 
democracy, a question of how to balance democratic principles and messaging strategies is not an 
easy one to answer.76 Arguably, this is a very important direction to study related to the application 
of governmental strategic communications countering a propaganda of radicalism. Forest proposes 
making strategic communications countering violent extremism a deed of the wider public via 
encouraging all potential communicators in the United States to put forward a message countering 
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violent ideology.77 Lesaca would agree with that analysis, saying that narratives distributed 
through non-government channels attract more attention.78 The right solution is somewhere 
between a government’s coordination of strategic communications and the public’s recognition of 
its significance in countering terrorists’ recruitment efforts.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
A government’s direct engagement with strategic communications to counter homegrown 
radicalization does not contradict democratic values. As discussed in the literature review, Islamic 
terrorists use propaganda as the main tool to recruit supporters in their war against Western 
societies. They benefit from the openness and transparency of democratic societies, as well as of 
the latest communication technologies. After 9/11, the American media deliberately traded the 
freedom of expression for strengthening security.79 Yet under formal peace, democratic norms and 
morality condition a democratic society in selecting tools in response to a given challenge. 
Governmental law-enforcement structures or private communication companies usually have the 
authority to silence those voices whose relation to propaganda has been revealed (e.g., after-the-
fact closing of social network accounts).  
As a part of its democratic reforms, Azerbaijan may face the challenge of making a choice 
between the freedom of expression and censorship of communication in order to prevent radical 
propaganda targeting its population. Nevertheless, a misapplication of censorship does not 
strengthen public confidence. Therefore, to counter homegrown radicalization, there is a need for 
a wider policy based on a scientific deep understanding of traditions, as well as consideration of 
the government’s credibility and support from non-state actors. 
Islamic terrorist networks rely on religious radicalization in their recruitment of new 
members who, additionally, own the citizenship of a particular targeted country. Moghaddam 
metaphorically presents a path of an individual to terrorist act as a staircase, where the most 
important transformation happens when an individual accepts the terrorist’s morality.80 Potential 
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targets live under various social conditions, far from the places where aspired morality dominates. 
Radicalization is first mentally constructed at the individual level before strategic communications 
come into play in this process of construction. 
Yet radicalization does not mean necessarily an inclination to commit a crime, as “most 
radicals are not terrorists.”81 The successful interruption of radicalization prevents the further 
course of actions eventually leading to crime. Moreover, an individual’s conscious refusal to 
continue “climbing the staircase” may serve the interests of countering recruitment activities. 
Thus, if countering homegrown radicalization by strategic communications succeeds, it can 
reproduce itself, contributing to an enhanced counterterrorism response. 
In the Republic of Azerbaijan, countering radical religious propaganda may be successful 
if there are engaged, trusted narratives based on the traditional understanding of Islam. Görzig and 
Al-Hashimi argue that it is not greater religiosity, but, on the contrary, a lack of knowledge about 
religion, that often leads to religious homegrown radicalization.82 In the early 1990s, weaker 
education of the traditional clergy helped radical Salafi groups in discrediting the traditional 
branches of Islam in Azerbaijan.83 Salafi groups in Azerbaijan have targeted traditional Shi’a, Sufi, 
and Sunni communities to win supporters. Consequently, Shi’a clergy and the most pious adepts, 
who lost the initial battles for hearts and minds due to their unpreparedness for religious disputes, 
consider Salafism a hostile ideology.84 Traditional worship of Sufi saints contradicts Salafism.85 
Thus, a natural rejection of Salafism exists in regions of Azerbaijan where Sufism is practiced. 
In the practice of strategic communications, overcoming a gap of critical religious 
information may better reach the targeted group and gain greater trust and confidence by using 
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aggressive communication tools. In some regions, one individual’s insufficient knowledge 
contributes to weaker critical thinking skills, and thus, the respective individual becomes more 
prone to radical propaganda targeting him. Jowett and O’Donell argue that in order to make a 
radicalized individual change his behavior, the government should employ a “response changing 
form of persuasion.”86 Response-changing information requires an anchor, which resonates with 
the persuadee’s beliefs. Johnson would support this argument, as he emphasizes the significance 
of interactive persuasion over the presentation of facts when planning information operations.87 
The non-violent Islamic traditions in Azerbaijan may provide the needed anchor; thus, trustworthy 
narratives could be built. Furthermore, as discussed in the literature review, the conditions favoring 
the elaboration of functional narratives based on true stories of Muslims exist in the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. 
E.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
This comparative research investigates how and why the United States and Azerbaijan vary 
in their application of strategic communications, and attempts to draw lessons for strengthening 
the institutional framework of Azerbaijan. There are similar challenges of radical Islamic 
propaganda facing both the United States and the Republic of Azerbaijan; yet differences exist, 
inter alia, in the nature of governance, population, and traditions. This interdisciplinary research 
uses concepts from counterterrorism, communication, political science, history, sociology, and 
journalism. Moreover, the research benefits from the comparative analysis of institutional 
frameworks and narratives of strategic communications in the United States and Azerbaijan. The 
argument is built on the examination and analysis of relevant academic literature, policy 
documents of the two countries, open-sourced documents, as well as media materials in English, 
Russian, and Azerbaijani.  
The underlying assumption of this thesis is that the American institutional framework for 
strategic communications can provide lessons for the enhancement of Azerbaijani homologous 
institutions. Though a variety of prohibitive measures are available for governments willing to 
fight against radicalization, this thesis is limited to strategic communications tools. Following the 
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historical development of strategic communications in the United States and Azerbaijan during the 
20th century, the thesis contrasts the legacies of their institutional frameworks with regard to 
governmental response to Islamic radicalization. 
The United States provides a good example of interaction between democratic values and 
strategic communications. American policy makers opposed the application of strategic 
communications even when structures such as the Committee on Public Information (CPI) and the 
Office of War Information (OWI) existed. Moreover, after World War II Congress banned 
government agencies from conducting strategic communications targeting the American 
population. Yet, the threat of homegrown terrorism made American policy makers recognize and 
reevaluate the role of strategic communications. Thus, American policy in this field is of particular 
interest for younger democracies such as Azerbaijan. 
At the same time, narratives anchoring Shi’a Islam, as well as pre-Islamic culture, are used 
to counter the spread of Salafi ideology in Azerbaijan. It is noteworthy the way in which 
Azerbaijan has promoted the peaceful coexistence of various traditional religions in the country. 
Narratives of multiculturalism anchor both religious and cultural traditions and challenge the Salafi 
propaganda in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s way offers a beneficial example of the use of narratives 
in countering propaganda of radicalization for other parts of the world. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The argument of this thesis is structured along five chapters, as follows. The first chapter 
sets the context of research by introducing the key concepts of strategic communications and 
propaganda, narratives, radicalization and violent extremism, terrorist propaganda and countering 
terrorist recruitment propaganda. By discussing various meanings and definitions, this first part 
sets the common understanding for the research.  
The second chapter highlights the historical development of the concept and organization 
of domestic strategic communications in the United States from World War I to the War on Terror. 
By addressing the historical examples of the creation of the U.S. CPI, OWI, and the House un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC), the chapter disentangles the institutional framework 
before the War on Terror. Furthermore, it examines the U.S. strategic communications response 
to radical Islamic propaganda. Thus, the second chapter attempts to offer a comprehensive 
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perspective on the framework for strategic communications countering terrorists’ use of 
propaganda for recruitment in the United States.  
The third chapter examines the historical development of propaganda during the 
Azerbaijan People’s Republic of 1918–1920, Soviet Azerbaijan of 1920–1991, and the Republic 
of Azerbaijan after 1991. The research follows the roots of the Azerbaijan government’s relations 
with Islam as a way to assess the development of the institutional framework of propaganda. Then 
the research examines the Azerbaijan government’s response to radical Islamic propaganda. 
Therefore, in contrast to the second chapter, this one attempts to synthesize the Azerbaijani 
perspective on radical Islamic propaganda. 
The fourth chapter compares and contrasts the historical development of strategic 
communications targeting domestic audiences in the United States and Azerbaijan and the 
application of this policy in counterterrorism of the respective countries. Furthermore, the analysis 
highlights the weak and strong points in each of the cases. The chapter draws policy parallels and 
divisions between the two countries and highlights potential opportunities for strengthening the 
strategic communications in countering terrorism. 
Finally, the last chapter attempts to answer the main research question by revising the 
legacies of both countries’ strategic communications that may affect their counterterrorism 
policies. It reminds the reader about the milestones of the current research before drawing policy 
recommendations for Azerbaijan’s counterterrorism policy in the field of informational warfare.  
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II. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
This chapter examines the historical development of the concept and organization of 
domestic strategic communications in the United States from World War I to the War on Terror. 
It scrutinizes the policies and activities of the American administrations, consisting of the 
deliberate dissemination of information, or its censorship, in order to influence domestic public 
opinion and behavior. During various periods, those activities as they related to the domestic 
audience were called propaganda for a case, propaganda against a case, public relations, 
communication, strategic communications, global engagement, and countering violent extremism. 
Although the word propaganda carries a negative meaning in the United States, this chapter accepts 
its broader definitions as “honest and forthright communication intended to advance a cause 
through enlightenment, persuasion, or a dedicated sense of mission,” and “propaganda is legitimate 
persuasion.”88 While influencing public opinion is also a goal of public relations, techniques often 
used by communication specialists include not telling all the truth or exaggerating parts of the 
truth. Deliberate falsehoods and malicious final goals are exclusively related to the perception of 
why propaganda is different from the previously mentioned. Fascists, Communists, and liberal 
democracies have used propaganda, but the difference was in the type of attitude they 
propagated.89 Even though American administrations used the word propaganda relative to their 
own domestic activities very carefully before the 1950s, arguably open distortions of facts used by 
the HUAC finally defined domestic propaganda as an illegitimate policy for the U.S. government. 
By the mid-1980s, the designation of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 
(the Smith–Mundt Act) transformed from regulating the government’s overseas information 
activities into prohibiting government’s domestic propaganda. In 1985, Nebraska Senator Edward 
Zorinsky claimed that restricting the government from conducting domestic propaganda 
distinguishes the United States from the Soviet Union.90 Thus, in the first parts of the Chapter I 
use the word propaganda authentically in comparison to the neutral meaning the U.S. government 
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officials applied to it; however, I examine those post-Cold War policies of American 
administrations that consisted of the dissemination of information domestically or the censorship 
of particular facts, naming them authentically as communications, global engagement, and 
countering violent extremism. 
In order to follow the historical development of American domestic strategic 
communications, this chapter first presents a review of the Committee on Public Information (CPI, 
1917–1919) and of the Office of War Information (OWI, 1942–1945) and discusses propaganda 
of the HUAC after World War II. Secondly, I discuss the Pentagon’s military censorship after 
World War II connected to the wider governmental efforts of “selling wars” to 
Americans. Finally, I review the domestic strategic communications after 9/11, particularly 
communications countering the ISIS terrorist organization, its propaganda, and recruitment among 
U.S. residents. The key features of ISIS propaganda targeting Americans are also discussed. The 
important role of U.S. overt domestic propaganda during the World Wars is indisputable. Despite 
past administrations’ affected disavowals of domestic propaganda, such messaging campaigns 
have been conducted, at least indirectly, through the use of large private media and public relation 
businesses. The U.S. government’s delay in adopting direct strategic communications to the 
American public about the threat of homegrown terrorism has been a disadvantage to the 
counterterrorism policies of the United States.  
A. THE CLASSICS OF AMERICAN DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA 
The first attempt at organizing governmental strategic communications in the United States 
is attributed to President Woodrow Wilson’s CPI. The CPI was created in April 1917 to promote 
pro-war public unity in the United States, where, by that time, some pro-German or Anglophobe 
groups had attempted to conduct anti-war propaganda.91 Although the CPI was short-lived, being 
dismantled as soon as the war ended in 1919, its legacy continued. Between the two World Wars, 
the interest in propaganda and counter-propaganda leaned more toward the American private 
sector and academia, rather than the government itself.92 One significant effort was the creation of 
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the Institute of Propaganda Analyses in 1937. The Institute stood out due to its innovative method 
of countering propaganda by identifying it and revealing it to the public. Yet the pattern of World 
War I almost repeated itself in the late 1930s. In the United States, the existence of “organizations 
supporting Germany” raised further concerns93 and contributed to debates about the ways to 
counter Nazi propaganda. The CPI and OWI integrated propaganda methods and tools, innovative 
for their time, now considered classic models of American domestic strategic communications.  
1. Narrative of the American Responsibility for Promoting Freedom in the 
World 
While the struggle for peace is probably the most widespread justification for wars, 
arguably a quintessence of American strategic communications narratives is the promotion of a 
domestic understanding of freedom for all people of the world. The CPI had a clear message of 
“America’s idealism, selflessness, and indomitable purpose,” through which it tried to sell the 
American public on the need for the U.S. participation in World War I, which was “a war to end 
all wars.”94 The United States did not have a defined narrative between the two World Wars, 
particularly before Pearl Harbor.95 Pearl Harbor triggered debate about whether the United States 
should continue to adhere to its policy of isolationism. Later, the American idea of a struggle for 
the four freedoms—“freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, 
freedom from fear”96—became the core message of domestic propaganda during World War II. 
The message for the Cold War was in Harry Truman’s Doctrine of March 1947, which announced 
that the United States was going to assist free people in their struggles all over the world because, 
from that point on, such assistance became a concern of national security for the United States.97 
This narrative indirectly meant that Americans had a duty to extend their domestic democracy to 
the world. Some additions to the main narrative were made during the Cold War, as for example 
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during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars when the Americans were helping the “Good Asians” 
(South Koreans and South Vietnamese) to fight the “Bad Asians” (Communists, China, and North 
Koreans).98 The end of Korean War allowed the administration to preserve the “elite’s 
consensus.”99 The lack of unity among U.S. policy makers about the Vietnam War did not help 
the government’s support for the one official narrative, as during the Korean War. The narrative 
was seriously challenged in light of the American support for the South Vietnam regime, which 
by conducting atrocities against the civilian population and deporting American reporters from the 
foremost media, such as the New York Times and Newsweek because of their consequent critics,100 
proved to be entirely undemocratic. Eventually, younger Americans recognized the Vietnam War 
as “immoral,”101 despite the U.S. government branding it as noble. 
The transformation of the free people’s struggle narrative during the presidency of Ronald 
Reagan deserves special consideration. During World War II, Reagan played roles in some 
propaganda movies; in the late 1940s, he became a strong supporter of the HUAC’s anti-
Communism campaign; in the late 1960s, he fought against anti-Vietnam War propaganda, and 
while he was a president of the United States, his administration heavily used overseas propaganda 
efforts.102 Unlike his predecessors, Reagan called for domestic mobilization in order to spread the 
American message overseas. During his inaugural address in 1981, Reagan, in addition to naming 
America “the bastion of Freedom” and stressing its commitment to peace, warned “enemies of 
freedom and terrorists” that the American nation was going to fight them using “will and 
courage.”103 Even those who criticize Reagan as a politician still recognize that foreign propaganda 
and domestic public relations were at their height during his administration.104 But most interesting 
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is that while the main narrative of the Cold War stayed untouched, during the Reagan period a 
differentiation between Communist totalitarians, against whom the United States fought, and anti-
Communist authoritarians, whom it supported, was introduced in order to justify the American 
backing of Central American dictatorships.105 Support for dictatorships was framed under the 
narrative of preferring the lesser evil. 
In contrast, during the Gulf War of 1991, the United States fought for the liberation of 
occupied Iraq, which allowed the framing of the war with idealistic approaches. President George 
Bush’s domestic-oriented narrative was that Saddam Hussein was another Adolf Hitler.106 A 
novelty was that the U.S. administration hired a public relations company—the Rendon Groupto 
investigate public opinion with the aim of constructing a better narrative.107 The rise of 
international terrorism critically reshaped the classic narratives of the American strategic 
communications. I discuss this reshaping in the following paragraphs.  
2. Institutional Framework 
The U.S. government’s strategic communications activity requires the cooperation of 
several government institutions. During World War I, the CPI was composed of the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy and headed by an experienced domestic 
political journalist, George Creel.108 Indeed, the same actorsthe media people, the Department 
of State, and the Pentagondominated the following history of American wartime propaganda. 
During the World Wars, their interaction was not smooth and contributed to the debate about 
favoring censorship of undesirable facts or dissemination of the preferred information. As a 
journalist, Creel advocated “for expression, not repression,”109 trying to avoid wartime censorship. 
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Based on the CPI model, during World War II, a journalist headed the OWI, which in 
addition to that employed writers and publicists. But unlike the CPI, the OWI was not composed 
of the leaders of the State Department or DoD, and consequently, the latter organizations were not 
friendly to the newly created institution. The OWI functions related to foreign broadcasting 
irritated the State Department; its civilian communicative approach to warfare annoyed the U.S. 
military, from which the Navy leadership particularly considered propaganda a function of military 
intelligence.110 The newly created Office of Strategic Services duplicated the OWI’s functions 
related to overseas propaganda. It was only the OWI’s domestic propaganda functions that other 
governmental institutions did not question. 
The tensions between governmental institutions contributed to disagreements in tactics. 
The OWI advocated for a “strategy of truth,” meaning that there would be minimal state 
interference into information, in order to demonstrate to the public that the government trusted 
them by sharing bad news as well.111 Meanwhile, the military, possessing negative information 
about the casualties, advocated for its suppression. Similarly, the U.S. Treasury wanted to withhold 
information that the United Kingdom was selling some goods to the United States, while the 
United States was sending other goods for free under Lend-Lease.112 The OWI had only to comply 
with leaving out undesirable facts. Yet the OWI’s input to the debate built up two concepts 
emphasizing the facts or propagating an ideology.113 While on the side of suppression nothing 
changed, these concepts widened the scope of the expression-oriented approach in American 
domestic strategic communications. 
The pattern repeated itself in the 1950s. The HUAC was investigating un-Americanism, 
which meant pro-Communism. Emphasizing the Communist threat to the United States was 
intended to raise the awareness of the American public. The critics of the time considered that the 
government had not just emphasized but “exaggerated information” about the Soviet nuclear 
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capabilities, while “diminishing” the relevant U.S. military capacities,114 in order to mobilize 
American public support for military interventions in Korea and Vietnam. Eventually, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in 1957 upheld complaints that the propagating of un-Americanism violated the 
First Amendment, and opened the way for the abolition of the HUAC. This limited the subsequent 
U.S. administrations in how they could communicate their agenda to emphasize favorable facts.  
In the absence of a single coordinated office of a domestically focused communication 
agency, the White House communication officials were in charge of communicating the 
administrations’ narratives to the Nation. Even before the OWI was created, in order to propagate 
“the New Deal policy,”115 the White House press office maintained direct relations with 
newspapers and provided them with materials (including cartoons). After the dismantlement of the 
OWI, during the Korean War, the Truman administration’s public relation officials augmented the 
procedures of domestically oriented propaganda.116 It was a period when government officials, 
private PR experts, and media representatives became one team.117 Most of the time, the White 
House Office of Communications coordinated the work of those public relations practitioners. By 
the early 1980s, the power elites succeeded in launching propaganda campaigns when necessary 
by co-opting intellectuals and large media companies.118 An active use of setting the media’s 
agenda and the framing of the news became a popular strategy for communicating the required 
idea to the public. 
3. The Role and Use of the Media 
The strategic communications policies of American administrations have always included 
the use of the print media as a way of conveying narratives, but particular communication channels 
were invented to reach a wider and more diverse audience. Alongside the print media, the National 
Board of Historical Service provided the CPI various cartoons and pamphlets, prepared based on 
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accurate and false data by scholars and historians.119 The CPI introduced new tactics. It created a 
voluntary organization called “The Four Minute Men,” whose members conducted four-minute 
presentations based on mentioned pamphlets in various places where people gathered (including 
but not limited to theaters and churches). Arguably the use of volunteers in propaganda is one of 
the most significant legacies of the CPI. 
While the United States rejected use of governmental domestic propaganda, Germany and 
the Soviet Union applied it, domestically and internationally, heavily using radio as a medium. 
Eventually, in the 1930s, some American experts became concerned about the propaganda use of 
radio by the Nazis.120 Radio had a greater power of penetration. Moreover, use of radio did not 
require paper. In fact, the conservation of paper during World War II caused the OWI to pay greater 
attention to the use of radio in its propaganda activities. The OWI inherited the method by which 
writers and publicists prepared pamphlets from the CPI but conveyed them through radio, where 
as a result of cooperation with several stations, the OWI received regular domestic airtime.121 The 
novelty was that the OWI gathered appropriate messages and then integrated them into stories 
broadcast by radio.122 Thus, a sense of the total war and a notion that wartime sacrifices are 
inescapable and pervasive were conveyed domestically. 
Additionally, from the very beginning, Hollywood has been a significant medium for 
American strategic communications efforts, targeting both domestic and international audiences. 
The CPI not only had a special Division of Films, which coordinated work with Hollywood on 
writing scenarios and producing documentaries, but also it censored the distribution of foreign 
movies that could harm the pro-war excitement of the American public. Thus, the British 
propaganda film The Battle of the Somme was restricted in the United States because its scenes of 
horrordead and wounded soldierscould negatively impact the recruitment of American 
soldiers.123 The OWI followed the CPI’s model, whose director Elmer Davis considered 
entertainment pictures as the most precise way to inject propaganda. Thus, Hollywood became an 
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important medium of the OWI.124 A special liaison office was established in Hollywood. Along 
with helping the state’s recruitment efforts and war bond sales, Hollywood’s promotion of patriotic 
feelings helped it to capitalize on war movies.125  
After World War II, American policy makers recognized Hollywood, as “the American 
advantage” in accessing communication channels,126 which made its role as a medium increase. It 
was not a coincidence that in 1945 the HUAC concentrated its activities on countering Communist 
infiltration “to the motion picture industry.”127 Arguably, the successful discovery of Communist 
propaganda in Hollywood productions, like the movie Mission to Moscow of 1942,128 served the 
HUAC’s intention of benefiting from Hollywood as a medium for the anti-Communist campaign. 
Eventually, more movies, like The Red Menace and the documentary Operation Abolition, were 
produced, presenting to the American public the narrative about the Communist conspiracy against 
the United States.129 The HUAC’s investigations made Hollywood producers more compliant to 
include its domestically oriented narratives into movie production, pushing Hollywood toward 
becoming a medium for domestic propaganda.  
4. Pentagon Input 
The development of propaganda strategies required the Pentagon to integrate simple 
censorship into wider and more sophisticated policies without, however, stepping back from the 
information suppression approach in general. In the late 1940s, the Pentagon carried out a 
campaign with the short-term goals of justifying the necessity of the American nuclear weapon 
program and conveying the message to the American public that the U.S. military was prepared to 
handle nuclear weapons. The reason for this campaign was that after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
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bombings terrified Americans questioned the need for the possession of the nuclear weapon.130 
The U.S. military promoted extensive media coverage for the nuclear bomb tests known as 
Operation Crossroads, and Universal Pictures produced several newsreels called Ready for Atom 
Tests at Bikini, Operation Crossroads, Atom Bomb Tests, and Operation Crossroads Underway. 
Though the tradition of the wartime cooperation between Hollywood and the military was still 
alive, pursuant to the trustworthiness of the narratives, the Pentagon did not pose itself as a creator 
of the newsreels. Later scholars characterized the tradition of exploiting relations established 
between administrations and the media during World War II in the early years of the Cold War as 
“camouflage propaganda” of the Truman administration.131 Using links and control over media, 
the Pentagon enthusiastically expressed those pieces of information it wanted, suppressing even 
the existence of an alternative.  
An exaggerated presentation of facts from the battlefields became mainly the Pentagon’s 
business during the most of the military campaigns of the late 20th century, reaching its heyday in 
the course of the Gulf War of 1991 and setting a foundation for the improvement of its propaganda 
tactics in the 21st century. From the very beginning of the Gulf War, the Pentagon restricted 
uncontrolled media access to the war theater and profited from Saudi Arabia’s general reluctance 
in issuing visas to the reporters.132 The Pentagon established the pools of U.S. journalists and 
provided those journalists with reports and news from high ranked militaries. Unsurprisingly, 
mainly positive pictures about the liberation of Kuwait found their way to American television. 
Yet the significant innovation in the domestic propaganda of the Gulf War was how the Kuwait 
government in exile employed its financial capabilities to influence public opinion in the United 
States. It hired the American public relations company Hill and Knowlton, which joined in 
spreading the Kuwait government’s narratives and produced exaggerated, anonymous, or fake 
materials about atrocities in Kuwait for the American media.133 Yet CNN’s direct broadcasts of 
war casualties from Baghdad did not fit the government’s agenda, and as a result of the broadcast, 
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some people remembered Vietnam.134 The Pentagon recruited retired officers who then actively 
promoted its message by producing independent military expert op-eds and participating in various 
TV and radio shows, organized by the media that cooperated with the government.135 Eventually, 
during the Iraq War of 2003, the American administration provided government officials, retired 
high-rank militaries, experts, lobbyists, and Internet bloggers with talking points that they further 
disseminated in media. 
Introducing the policy of journalists embedded in the military units together with restricting 
access to the battlefield became a novelty during the Iraq War. Unlike the Gulf War, in 2003 the 
Pentagon allowed journalists to accompany troops, of course, under the condition that the reporters 
were not to report on sensitive materials.136 In addition to that, the range of media was widened; 
print magazines and foreign journalists were allowed into the pools in order to provide the wider 
public with the arranged information from the battlefield. Embedded reporters’ natural solidarity 
with the fighting units resulted in materials praising the military. This uncritical approach and one-
sided admiration of the army’s professionalism was the key effect of embedding journalists, which 
the military counted on.137 Definitely, it was based on an exaggeration of some facts while not 
reporting others, but it recognized the media’s natural desire for colorful pictures and hot news. 
B. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION DURING THE WAR ON TERROR 
The metaphorical dimension of the War on Terror makes it completely different from the 
previous wars America fought after World War II. In the War on Terror, everybody could be an 
enemy. At the same time, it became the first war that did not need many efforts to be propagated 
among Americans. Unlike World War I, or still, differently from World War II (only taking into 
consideration the Pearl Harbor attack), it is a war that Americans have not been able to avoid at 
all—it started with al-Qaeda’s attack on America’s territory. The War on Terror did not need war 
propaganda, though the American government heavily used its narratives and got public support 
for their agenda in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East.  
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The term War on Terror is the main narrative of American strategic communication after 
9/11. The origins of the metaphor could easily resonate with the War on Drugs campaign 
conducted by earlier American administrations, yet because of the intangibility of terror, unlike 
drugs, as a narrative, it could also be associated with the victorious Cold War.138 The introduction 
of the term “war” has made possible following the framing of the policies and employing of public 
relations consultants to “spin” the message.139 President George Bush announced that the war 
would be a struggle of good against evil, targeting not only terrorists but also those who harbored 
them. This message of struggle resembles the one typically used for a total war. The government 
started with the messages well-known to the nation from the movies, demonstrating how people 
should act during crises. By that time Hollywood blockbusters, such as The Siege, had already 
integrated tough rhetoric of the heroes into scenarios, resulting in popular mobilization during a 
crisis period. The president’s expression “Make no mistake” echoed the same expression from The 
Siege.140 The tough messages inspiring people to a self-sacrificing struggle got to Hollywood as a 
result of the government’s wartime domestic propaganda and developed there during peacetime in 
various dramatic scenarios. Unlike the propaganda during previous wars, the version during the 
War on Terror has had an easier task because there hardly was a need to sell this war to the nation 
already affected by 9/11. The framing of policies and information on the War on Terror became 
the main strategy of the government’s communication with its domestic audience. 
It is not surprising then that by having widespread media on its side, the Bush 
administration in its efforts to organize strategic communication during the War on Terror was 
counting on Hollywood particularly. Public emotions caused by 9/11 guaranteed the media’s 
compliance to disseminate information as the government wanted, without asking questions.141 
Countering al-Qaeda’s propaganda was a realm where the administration acted even more openly. 
Then national security adviser Condoleeza Rice provided special guidance to CNN and Rupert 
Murdoch’s Fox News leaders in order not to give a platform to terrorists.142 Generally, the White 
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House favored media representatives who acted in accordance with its propaganda message and 
non-disclosure of criticizing information policy by granting them access to interviews with 
administration officials.143 The media helped to create the conditions of a non-debate and 
acceptance, yet employing the entertainment industry could evoke even more supportive public 
emotions. The role of Hollywood would be to promote patriotism, and the White House invited 
movie producers to participate in the War on Terror.144 The Murdoch-owned Fox studio produced 
the first post-9/11 movie called Behind Enemy Lines that resounded with the administration’s 
narrative.  
The period after 9/11 has shown significant development in the debate about the 
institutionalization of the U.S. government’s domestic strategic communication. In 2004, the 
Defense Science Board Task Force’s report on strategic communication defined the domestic 
realm as a part of the government’s public affairs activities, stressing that because of the borderless 
nature of media, it cannot be distinct from the activities targeting foreign audiences.145 While 
mainly considering a foreign audience, the report particularly mentions the White House Office of 
Global Communication, which was created in June 2002, as the institution best prepared to shape 
domestic perceptions after the 9/11 attack. Much attention was given to enhancing government-
private cooperation, particularly in order to attract American intellectual human resources to the 
organization of strategic communication, even though the report focused on strategic 
communication with a foreign audience. Later decisions, such as the formation of the Interagency 
Policy Coordinating Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications in 2006 and 
then the establishment of the interagency Counterterrorism Communication Center (CTCC), 
enforced the coordinative approach in the field.146 The State Department’s Digital Outreach Team, 
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created in 2006,147 and the State Department’s Center of Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications (CSCC), created in 2011, dealt with radical Islam and al-Qaeda propaganda on 
the Internet; however, as a part of the State Department, the CSCC was limited to foreign audiences 
in their vernacular languages not familiar to the American audience.148 The CSCC’s well-known 
Twitter page “Think Again Turn Away” became the first governmental campaign directly 
engaging U.S. officials with the Internet audience in order to counter terrorists’ worldwide 
recruitment activities online. Still, the narratives of these new institutions targeted populations 
abroad.  
The August 2012 hearings in the House of Representatives demonstrated that policy 
makers did not have a clear vision with regard to which governmental institution is needed to 
conduct domestic strategic communication. At the time, some scholars fairly considered the 
Smith–Mundt Act as a legislative obstacle to the government’s strategic communication targeting 
Americans.149 Initially, the provisions of the Act said that the government’s overseas information 
activities were allowed. Amendments to the Act in 1970 and 1985 made it clear that overseas 
information was restricted from domestic distribution because “American taxpayers shouldn’t 
fund propaganda for an American audience.”150 In the Internet age, it meant that the State 
Department should refrain from broadcasting any propaganda materials abroad because they 
would reach domestic audiences. The policy makers were concerned that the State Department’s 
good informational material used overseas to fight al-Qaeda could not be used at home.151 
Eventually, the Smith–Mundt Modernization Act of 2012 “authorized the domestic dissemination 
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of information about the United States intended primarily for foreign audiences.”152 Still, the 
Modernization Act was related only to the dissemination of information, not to its adaptation for 
the American public that made sense in the case of countering terrorist propaganda. Influencing 
American public opinion was not authorized for the Department of State. The Smith–Mundt 
Modernization Act did not consider any authorities of American government institutions, other 
than the Department of State. 
Meanwhile, the popularization of the Internet was followed by terrorists’ interest in this 
new technological advantage, which contributed to radical Islamists’ growing capacities to find 
supporters among Americans. Despite the fact that al-Qaeda showed interest in recruiting people 
with American passports almost from the late 1990s,153 because of the small number of 
homegrown terrorist cases in the United States from 2002 to 2008 and the absence of committed 
attacks before 2010,154 the causes of homegrown jihadism were not addressed as much as other 
realms of the War on Terror. Yet the first alarm rang when the first American suicide-
bomberShirwa Ahmeddied in a suicide attack in Mogadishu in October 2008. The following 
investigations revealed more preparations for terrorist plots with U.S. citizens being recruited 
while in the United States by al-Qaeda affiliated terrorists via the Internet.155 An American-born 
radical cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, was recruiting Americans to conduct terrorist acts in the United 
States; another U.S. citizen, Samir Khan, left the United States in 2009 to establish al-Qaeda’s 
online magazine Inspire targeting English-speaking communities. In early 2011, the Homeland 
Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano, admitted the growing threat of involvement of U.S. citizens 
in terrorist plots in the United States.156 By that time, al-Qaeda had elaborated narratives 
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specifically addressing U.S. residents and based on the terrorists’ violent religious ideology.157 
The immigrants in the United States who practiced Salafism became the target audience for radical 
Islamist propaganda through Internet media. Yet being Salafi did not mean acceptance of jihadism 
instantly. Osama bin Laden defined the key narratives distinguishing jihadists, such as disavowal 
of polytheism and its supporters (al-Wala’ wa-l-bara’), religious struggle (jihad), and 
excommunication of other Muslims (takfir).158 Factually, al-Wala wa-l-bara is a narrative 
countering religious tolerance. Furthermore, ISIS institutionalized and enhanced the online 
propaganda and recruitment of U.S. residents. Even though by 2015 American policy makers 
officially recognized the threat of lone-wolf terrorists, radicalized online, to the United States,159 
the government’s countering of radical propaganda efforts was only in its early stage in 2016. 
Arguably, from the very beginning of the War on Terror, the United States needed strategic 
communication policies to counter domestic terrorism and related issues.  
The government’s response to the domestic realm included various policies countering 
extremism; among them was working with ethnic and religious communities in order to instill a 
rejection of radical religious ideology. In 2011, the U.S. Government released the first counter 
extremism strategy that included countering extremist propaganda, yet no new resources were 
assigned for its realization.160 By 2011, the National Counterterrorism Center was partly focused 
on countering the narratives of violent extremism, particularly in relation to the communities that 
interested terrorists as recruitment audiences.161 In this regard, the National Counterterrorism 
Center, in cooperation with the DHS and FBI, disseminated unclassified information about the 
realities of the terrorists’ recruitment among American communities. Finally, in 2015 the Office 
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for Community Partnerships (OCP) at DHS was established in order to counter domestic violent 
extremism, propaganda, and recruitment. Its CVE activities are defined as “proactive actions to 
counter efforts by extremists to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence.”162 The 
establishment of the OCP and its CVE Task Force constitutes by now the government’s most 
significant attempt to use strategic communication in countering domestic terrorism in the United 
States. 
Unlike traditional propaganda institutions before, the OCP is not committed to clear 
narratives but to counter extremism. It generally promotes tolerance, inclusion, and pluralism, and 
in order to work out more clear messages within those ideas, it attracts representatives of the 
possible target audiences of terrorists. The activities of the OCP have a specific direction to disrupt 
the beliefs and will to act of those who have been radicalized and recruited to commit a terror 
act.163 As a part of its Peer-2-Peer Challenging Extremism competition beginning in 2015, 
university students from different countries developed their own narratives countering terrorist 
recruitment through social media.164 Countering violent extremism among foreign audiences is a 
task of the Global Engagement Center (GEC), created in March 2016 as a replacement for the 
Center of Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. Relative to its messaging strategy, the GEC 
exploits the same attitude as the OCP, with the only difference being that its foreign partners for 
the particular foreign audiences construct the GEC’s messages. Even though the GEC avoids direct 
online engagement with its audiences, it admits that it aims to change the behavior of foreign 
audiences,165 thus making possible easy identification of the GEC as a propaganda institution. 
Although the OCP, being domestically focused, uses more careful expressions, its CVE measures 
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are nothing other than a set of activities targeting the changing behavior of potential extremists; 
this places the OCP on the short list of U.S. domestic propaganda institutions. 
The OCP uses an innovative methodology to engage the population into the realization of 
the goals of CVE. In order to promote its narratives, the OCP uses various entitieslaw 
enforcement and governmental organizations, municipal officials, civic organizations and the 
private sector. At the same time, it considers “young people, Millennials, victims of terrorists, and 
community-based organizations” the most credible instruments for CVE.166 By 2017 the OCP’s 
grant program funded 26 projects for the prevention of terrorism in the United States.167 The 
prevention activities funded by the grant, among others, presumed awareness campaigns and 
countering terrorism narratives. The OCP works with private sector communications companies 
to counter terrorist propaganda online. It tries to incorporate both cyberspace and local community 
space. Community organizations promote youth education about the prevalence of misinformation 
about Islamic values on the Internet and social media. The OCP’s commitment to educate and then 
engage wider groups of the population to counter terrorism propaganda is an innovation in the 
sphere. It works for people’s recognition of their potential and shared responsibility between the 
government and the public in countering terrorist communications. 
The FBI’s Office of Partner Engagement (OPE) has carried out similar communication 
programs as a part of its prevention activities targeting domestic communities at greater risk of 
radicalization. Its activities go in two directions: 1) community engagement and 2) the production 
of educational materials. The community engagement activities contribute to the formation of a 
wider network of messengers, who, at the same, time participate in the compiling of narratives. 
The production of educational materials, in fact, resembles classic propaganda activities enhanced 
with the use of Internet technologies. The FBI created a website, “Don’t be a puppet; pull back the 
curtain on violent extremism,” and promoted its use by various mediators as educational material 
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targeting general audiences including children.168 The agency also produced several 
documentaries, such as A Revolutionary Act, Redemption, and Active Shooter: Managing the Mass 
Casualty Threat, mainly related to the acts of the homegrown terrorism in the United States. The 
FBI communication programs with the aim to prevent crime incidents are complementary to its 
law enforcement activities. 
C. THE PROPAGANDA OF ISIS 
Even though ISIS announced the establishment of its statehood in January 2007, its embryo 
developed from an earlier period as an al-Qaeda branch in the region. Al-Qaeda considered its war 
against the United States as the prelude to creating an Islamic state, as it becomes clear from Osama 
bin Laden’s speeches about the restoration of a caliphate.169 Unlike al-Qaeda, ISIS prioritized the 
war against apostates, such as Shi’a Muslims and other traitors backed by the West. It is widely 
accepted that the main narrative of ISIS propaganda is that it is a real Muslim Sunni state, and one 
of the key targets of its propaganda was the promotion of the immigration to the territories under 
the terrorists’ control.170 ISIS used six sets of themes: brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, 
belonging, and utopianism.171 In addition to the promotion of immigration, some ISIS supporters 
targeted the intimidation of its opponents, employed revelations of the atrocities of the coalition 
forces, and emphasized the inspiration of supporters and recruitment. ISIS promised an alternative 
life, yet its Hollywood-style documentaries and magazine Dabiq were saturated with colorful and 
inspiring pictures reflecting the set of narratives. The narrative about “five-star jihad” pretending 
that ISIS members enjoy luxury lives in villas captured by the organization was very attractive for 
vulnerable individuals. A lot of unsatisfied people followed ISIS’s appeal, disseminated in social 
media. Yet in its attempts to sell a war against a broad set of enemies, such as apostate Muslims, 
Jews, Christians, non-Muslim Kurds, and the Western countries, ISIS needed an effective 
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organization of propaganda and a variety of complementary narratives and stories defining the 
reasons for the hostility toward those enemies.  
The organizational charter of ISIS propaganda consisted of official and non-official bodies. 
The official propaganda institutions are the Al Hayat Media center (whose main focuses are 
recruiting and presenting an idyllic society) and Al Furqan Media Foundation (whose main effort 
is to spread fear).172 The Al Hayat Media center has produced visual, audio, and written materials, 
including Dabiq magazine, dealt with social media, and disseminated those materials on the 
Internet. In addition to these official organs, various groups of supporters and ISIS fighters 
constantly produce propaganda on the Internet. One of them, the al-Battar Media Group, 
specializes in the mobilization of ISIS activities on Twitter and has attracted about 32,000 
followers.173 Those who professionally deal with propaganda issues in ISIS are considered the 
elite of the organization, and are better paid and cared for accordingly.  
The pillars of the ISIS Salafi-jihadi ideology initially prioritized its anti-Shia and anti-Sufi 
narratives to anti-Americanism. From the perspective of the 20th century’s Salafi terrorists 
preceding al-Qaeda, the Western colonizers are their traditional enemy. Though al-Qaeda opposed 
targeting Shi’a Muslims in Iraq, the future ideologist of ISIS, Zarqawi, argued in 2004 that Shi’as 
are a primary danger in comparison with Americans; later ISIS leader al-Baghdadi proclaimed in 
2007 that fighting against traitors, unbelievers, liars, criminals, and other apostate Muslims is of 
greater necessity than that against Crusaders.174 Thus, even pursuant to a desire to relate anti-Shi’a 
narratives to the war against the United States, ISIS could hardly accuse Iran of serving the United 
States; thus, it blamed the United States for assisting in the realization of Iran’s Shi’a agenda. The 
anti-American narratives of ISIS ideologists originally included the United States’ complicity in 
Iran’s attempts at turning Iraq into a Shi’a state and the weakness of the American military in 
Iraq.175 Yet after the coalition’s airstrikes of August 2014, ISIS (which by that time had just 
become a caliphate) officially called for attacks on Americans all over the world. In September 
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2014, ISIS widened the main narrative that became the “Crusader-Shi’a-Zionist conspiracy against 
the Muslim Sunni State.”176 As the United States became a target for ISIS, anti-American 
narratives were no less important than anti-Shi’a ones. 
The first ISIS threats toward the United States became notorious mainly because of the 
American media’s large coverage. According to its mandate, the Al-Furqan Media Foundation 
disseminated the videotaped beheadings of the American journalists James Foley and Steven 
Sotloff in September 2014. Nacos points out that because YouTube instantly blocked the James 
Foley video, as well as people’s aversion to seeing the full picture of the horror, the Internet was 
not primary in delivering the message to the Americans, whom ISIS targeted originally.177 But the 
American media granted the following heavy coverage of the video and subsequently of ISIS’s 
messages.  
Another tactic of ISIS propaganda is its use of the U.S. or other Western policy makers’ 
expressions related to ISIS in the interests of enforcing and legitimizing the terrorists’ own 
narratives. The permanent rubrics of Dabiq have been called “The Enemy Words” and 
continuously discussed mostly pieces of American leaders’, policy makers’ and high ranked 
officials’ statements endorsing ISIS’s message of the day. In July 2014 it presented excerpts of 
statements of the high-ranking U.S. National Security Council official Douglas Ollivant and 
Senator John McCain, who had both in various words expressed their concerns about ISIS control 
over large territories, ISIS becoming a natural state, and terrorists’ gains in weaponry.178 The 
magazine tried to demonstrate the absence of consensus among U.S. policy makers relative to the 
necessity of fighting with ISIS. Issues of Dabiq published after the strikes of 2014 cited the U.S. 
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saying that Iran’s Shi’a agenda was more dangerous for 
America than ISIS and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official Michael Scheuer arguing 
that the United States should not interfere in Iraq and should leave its Shi’a and Sunni enemies to 
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fight one another, which would bring the United States victory without paying a cent.179 Dabiq’s 
comments said that contrary to American general wisdom, power was not in weapons and 
technology but it was a belief in God and agreed that the United States should let ISIS deal with 
Iran. The same issue presented excerpts of the testimony of U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 
saying that ISIS had increased its global profile, was greatly organized, was attracting Americans, 
and that it was safe to plot attacks against the United States while residing in ISIS-controlled 
territories.180 Framing this sort of information with traditional Dabiq reports about ISIS’s attacks 
against Shi’as and life in the Caliphate mainly targeted American audiences. Anchoring one’s own 
propaganda narratives targeting the enemy’s population using the enemy’s own message is not a 
new concept and contributes to the legitimacy of ISIS propaganda. 
ISIS has largely enhanced the speed of the dissemination of its propaganda products by 
using social media, particularly Twitter and Facebook. One of the most significant shifts in ISIS 
propaganda targeting recruitment of U.S. residents’ was the growing use of online jihadists’ 
content. By 2015 a vast majority of ISIS recruitment cases among U.S. residents excluded any 
physical meetings with recruiters, while including prior reading and sharing of online content and 
communication with ISIS recruiters through social media.181 Twitter was the most popular social 
network for ISIS propaganda for recruitment, granting secure private communication. During the 
heyday of ISIS propaganda activities, there were, by late 2014, about 2,000 propagandists who 
tweeted 150 times every day, and the number of overt ISIS supporters on Twitter reached 
46,000.182 Eventually, it resulted in Twitter suspending those accounts, and their number decreased 
in 2015. ISIS exploited social media capabilities, recognizing the role of online inspiration and its 
reduced risks. Since 2014 there have been 12 jihadist attacks (six being lethal) in the United States 
perpetrated by U.S. residents inspired by ISIS in social networks. ISIS-inspired American militants 
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Elton Simpson and Nadir Soofi (2015 attack in Garland) were recruited via social media; U.S. 
citizens Omar Mateen (2014 attack in Orlando) and Joshua Cummings (2017 attack in Denver) 
were self-radicalized, or “self-recruited,” online.183 Even before the territorial losses of the last 
few years, ISIS was persuading those U.S. residents who wished to join the organization in the 
Middle East that staying in the United States and fighting there is more important. According to 
research of the think-tank New America, the speeches of Anwar al-Awlaki inspired American 
recruits in 72 terrorist plot cases since 9/11, including those after he was killed in 2011.184 This 
demonstrates that killing terrorists does not kill their ideas. The U.S. National Counterterrorism 
Center considers that despite the loss of its territory, ISIS will be able to continue to inspire terrorist 
attacks worldwide.185 As the numbers show, its territorial losses hardly reduced the effects of ISIS 
online propaganda and recruitment in the United States as well. 
D. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 
Measuring the effectiveness of strategic communication is a challenging task because not 
all the goals of strategic communication are easily measured.186 One of the main obstacles is in 
correlating the narratives accurately to their achieved effect. In terms of effect, strategic 
communication aim to bring about the desired change in people’s behavior. Even though change 
of beliefs can be approximately measured, they do not necessarily result in a change of behavior.187 
Despite the difficulties, the key tasks of measurement of the effectiveness of strategic 
communication can be addressed, albeit imperfectly.  
For effective strategic communication, both clear objectives and expectations are 
essential.188 They may constitute visible markers of changes in the environment and thus help in 
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measuring the overall success of the strategic communication. Depending on the nature of the 
objectives and expectations, there may be various ways to measure whether those objectives and 
expectations are met. “Selling a war” to Americans has been the objective for the majority of 
strategic communication campaigns of several U.S. administrations, and public support for 
government policies has been the main expectation. Target-audience analysis may help to evaluate 
an ongoing strategic communication campaign and introduce better influencing tools.189 Public 
opinion research polls, the dynamics in war bond sales, and the number of terrorist plots can be 
used in measuring to what degree objectives and expectations are reached. At the same time, even 
if there are positive dynamics in reaching the objectives of strategic communication, whether the 
effect can be attributed to strategic communication or something else has to be determined. 
The evaluation of the means through which objectives have been targeted can help to 
understand the effect, if any, of the strategic communication.190 This process includes a 
reassessment of how and why the narratives were selected, an analysis of how efficient the control 
over the medium was, and a determination of the ratio between the expression of the information 
and its repression. American propaganda institutions of the first two World Wars, the CPI and the 
OWI, both selected very emotional narratives justifying the U.S. participation. The justification of 
American participation in World War I is by now recognized within the framework of the CPI’s 
narratives.191 Self-censorship, voluntary censorship, and enforced censorship during those wars 
demonstrate the degree of greater control over the medium. Meanwhile, Japan’s attack on Pearl 
Harbor was no less persuasive for Americans to recognize the necessity of U.S. participation in 
World War II. Measuring the efficiency of the organization of strategic communication cannot 
determine clearly the role of strategic communication in the process of reaching the government’s 
goals. But it can help to adjust and enhance the policy of strategic communication, which 
constitutes a significant task for the measurement itself. 
Measuring the effectiveness of strategic communication in countering terrorism is linked 
to the overall success of counterterrorism, including countering terrorists’ recruitment. The final 
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success of counterterrorism would be a victory over terrorism. In his discussion of what a victory 
over terrorism is, Daniel Byman points out that for the Americans, success in countering terrorism 
includes the reduced level of deaths from terrorism on U.S. soil.192 In order to reduce the level of 
deaths from terrorism, individuals’ way to violence must be interrupted or terrorists’ plots must be 
revealed in time. While the investigation into plots is a task for law enforcement, the preventive 
interruption of individuals’ way toward the commitment of a terrorist act is a responsibility for 
strategic communication. The success of strategic communication countering terrorists’ 
propaganda in the United States is necessary for victory itself.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The public concerns about American administrations violating the freedom of expression 
have followed the historical development of the concept and organization of domestic strategic 
communication in the United States from World War I to the War on Terror. During its two-year-
long existence, the CPI faced the dilemma of balancing the necessities of a war and the values of 
a democracy, and Creel found a solution by naming the censorship CPI employed as 
“voluntary.”193 When Congress discussed the necessity of establishing the OWI, particular 
constraints were considered to prohibit the future propaganda agency from trying “to control 
morale.”194 Some scholars point out that the OWI’s influence over Hollywood movie production 
contributed to the degeneration of critical thinking among those affected by propaganda movies.195 
After World War II, the HUAC counter-propaganda activities and anti-communist propaganda 
movies caused concern among liberal groups in the United States who saw these efforts as a threat 
to the First Amendment. At the same time, the military keep their right to censor information and 
to put restraints on journalists by setting journalist pools.  
While the United States has conducted international propaganda openly, it has carried out 
the same activities targeting domestic audiences less directly. Often, strategic communication 
directed at domestic audiences was based on the White House’s connections among large 
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businesses, the media, and public relations professionals. The symbiosis between some leading 
media companies and particular large businesses interested in government and military orders has 
helped to promote the necessary war propaganda. American administrations have used several 
other factors in conducting domestic propaganda: the interflow of public relations professionals 
from administrations to large business and back, the presence of some media executives on the 
Boards of Directors of defense contractors, and major media outlets owned by businesses having 
interests in cooperation with the government. Several U.S administrations have been able to 
subcontract the dissemination of their messages to private businesses.  
The American public has been very intolerant of anything called domestic propaganda and 
related activities that have included domestically oriented policies variously referred to as public 
relations, public diplomacy, and public opinion management. From the late 1980s, a new definition 
of government propaganda—strategic communication—became widespread. Unlike propaganda, 
as Douglas Wilbur notes, “the vast majority of strategic communication is both legitimate and 
necessary for a modern society to function.”196 At the same time, American administrations have 
preserved their capabilities of selling a war to Americans when needed and are no longer accused 
of not paying respect to the First Amendment as it happened in the 1950s. 
The pervasiveness of the mass media in the United States is very important when 
governmental domestic strategic communication is discussed in terms of democratic values. The 
periods of war have made it clear that a government may use popular mobilization and find a way 
to attract the leading media to its side during crises; still, the media will have to persuade the 
public. The simple way to do it in a democracy is to make people think about what is needed and 
elevate some facts over others, or to frame the news.197 Framing of news allows media to appear 
objective and works for its power of persuasion. The increased flow of information facilitated by 
technological advances in communication has empowered media to use framing to implicitly 
convey the government’s narratives to the public. 
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The 9/11 attack on American soil and the War on Terror revived a dimension of warfare—
a war of ideas. The United States defeated al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2003, killed Osama bin 
Laden in 2010 and Anwar al-Awlaki in 2011, and largely defeated ISIS by 2017. The State 
Department joined the war directing communication at the nations of the Middle East to counter 
terrorist ideology; however, the government was initially prohibited from disseminating the same 
ideas to Americans. In contrast to their losses on the battlefields of the Middle East, during this 
time the terrorists were gaining ground on the Internet by disseminating their ideas recorded on 
videos, inspiring supporters, and propagating a violent ideology among Americans. Still being 
very careful of anything resembling domestic propaganda, the FBI and DHS began their activities 
to prevent the spread of violent radical ideologies in the United States, under the framework of 
Countering Violent Extremism. Because decisive victories in the Middle East did not follow those 
on the ideological battleground in the United States, the latter constitutes the vulnerable flank and 
requires enforcement. The U.S. government has to organize its strategic communication 
countering terrorist narratives in such a way that the larger American population would join a total 
information war on terror. 
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III. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND PROPAGANDA 
IN AZERBAIJAN 
This chapter examines the history of strategic communication in Azerbaijan starting with 
the 20th century.  The examination encompasses both governmental strategic communication 
countering terrorism and the strategic communication of radical Salafists in Azerbaijan. Notably, 
unlike in the United States, the term “strategic communication” has no real meaning in Azerbaijan. 
In the context of Azerbaijan, the term təbliğat198 is used to refer to the spread of ideas among 
people. It carries a neutral connotation and is most literally translated into English as propaganda 
or popularization.199 Governmental institutions of Azerbaijan use təbliğat to describe their 
promotion of Azerbaijani culture, tourism in Azerbaijan, or the propaganda of patriotism among 
youth. At the same time, relative to the propaganda concerning the radical religions or hostile 
Armenian deception, the term təbliğat is used as well. The term propaganda, however, as a 
neologism, is sometimes used in the Azerbaijani language, and in those very rare cases, it carries 
the highly negative connotation. To be consistent, I use the word propaganda throughout this 
chapter, even though in the original it appears as təbliğat or strategic communication. 
From the 20th century, the history of state propaganda in Azerbaijan consists of three 
distinct periods, each of which has its particular legacy in the domestic propaganda of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan. In this chapter, I discuss the ideology and religious propaganda of the First 
Azerbaijan Republic (1918–1920), because its legacy is in the establishment of the narratives of 
secularism and nationalism in contemporary Azerbaijani propaganda. Then I proceed to the anti-
Islam propaganda during Soviet times (with a short break during World War II), because its legacy 
has largely enforced the secularism of contemporary Azerbaijani propaganda and affected its 
institutional framework. Finally, I address the patriotism propaganda of the independent Republic 
of Azerbaijan after 1991, whose legacy will be the mobilization of popular support for the 
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government under the perceived existential threat200 to Azerbaijani nation-statehood triggered by 
Armenian aggression. 
Following the analysis of the development of state propaganda in Azerbaijan, the chapter 
sheds light on domestic religious extremism and the challenges for state propaganda in responding 
to that problem. Concerns related to domestic religious extremism in Azerbaijan, as a result of 
importing radical Shi’ism, grew after the Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran. Nonetheless, a 
sense of alienation from Iran is inherent in the majority of Azerbaijanis because of the suppression 
of their compatriots in Iran. That identification does not work for the popularization of ideas if 
they originate in Iran; additionally, government propaganda in Azerbaijan uses accusations in 
connection with Iran as one of the most powerful narratives targeting citizens of Azerbaijan in 
order to compromise radical Shi’a ideas. The Salafi branch of Islam, which is non-traditional for 
Azerbaijan, appeared in the country in the early 1990s. Following it, within a few years, Salafi-
jihadists established their first cells in the country. Initially, the Gulf countries’ benevolent 
foundations promoting aid to Muslim populations spread the Salafi version of Islam among the 
more vulnerable people, such as refugees or other audiences, affected by socio-economic 
difficulties of the early 1990s. As Barbara Walter argues, an extremist ideology may better succeed 
even among moderate audiences during times of uncertainty.201 Then Azerbaijanis who studied in 
the religious institutions of Saudi Arabia established separate communities of well-educated 
Salafists, who in their turn developed a propaganda system based on the narratives of Global 
Salafism and targeting the local population in Azerbaijan. At the same time, becoming a Salafi 
made those people possible targets for jihadist propaganda and terrorist recruitment. Despite the 
comprehensive administrative measures limiting radical propaganda in Azerbaijan, the country is 
particularly vulnerable to Islamic radicalization from abroad. 
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A. IDEOLOGY AND PROPAGANDA DURING THE AZERBAIJANI PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC 
In 1918–1920, during the period of the first independent republic of Azerbaijan, as a result 
of the several decades’ long domestic debates concerning Azerbaijani national identity, the pillars 
of the national propaganda of secularism were set up. In the early 20th century, the Azerbaijani 
philosopher Ali Hussainzade’s formula of Turkism, modernization, and Islamization dominated in 
the debate between intellectuals.202 The ideologist of Pan-Turkism Ziya Gokalp admitted that he 
adopted the slogan “Turkify, Islamicize, Europeanize” from Hussainzade.203 This fact has 
determined the uniformity of Azerbaijani and Turkish national secularism, in contrast to the 
traditional religious division between Azerbaijanis and Turks.204 Under the influence of Ali 
Hussainzade’s ideas, the colors of the national flag of the first republic reflected the priorities of 
the national ideology as Turkism (blue), then modernism (red), and then Islamism (green). In 1919, 
Azerbaijani intellectuals were still debating the national identity and language.205 Yet the majority 
of them, including the publishers of the most widely readmagazine, Molla Nasreddin,206 were 
clearly anti-clerical. Various scholars argue that given the pan-Turkic aspirations of the Ottoman 
Empire,207 an extreme Turkism posed a threat to the independence of the republic, and this 
reinforced the elaboration of the term Azerbaijanism.208 This notion shortly reappeared in the 
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1950s and finally formed in the 1990s within a different context, and I discuss it in the chapter. In 
1918, the Declaration of Independence of the Azerbaijan People’s Republic209 guaranteed equal 
rights and conditions for the development of all of its citizens, regardless of nation, class, religion, 
or gender. Gradualism and compromise became parts of Azerbaijani national culture.210 It put an 
end to the debate on identity and historically constituted the limits of Azerbaijani nationalism and 
determined the narratives of its propaganda. 
The propaganda of the Azerbaijan People’s Republic had as its main goal the mobilization 
of its population in the face of an existential threat to the Azerbaijani state whose national 
government did not even control its capital. On May 28, 1918, the republic itself was proclaimed 
in neighboring Georgia’s capital Tbilisi, and the first government was formed in the remote 
Azerbaijani city of Ganja because the capital Baku was still under Bolshevik control.211 In addition 
to that, the Armenian Dashnak units were committing massacres in several cities of the country.212 
Because tsarist colonial policy manipulated the ethnic tensions between Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis, during that period an opinion that the Armenians were the Russians’ surrogates 
emerged among Azerbaijanis for the first time.213 Despite these tumultuous conditions, the 
national government of Azerbaijan promptly established its institutions, including the Ministry of 
Education and Religious Confession, then the Ministry of Social Provision and Religious Affairs, 
and eventually, in September 1918, the Islamic Spiritual Administration.214 Among the first 
measures, the Azerbaijani Military Ministry authorized special military clergymen to teach the 
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basics of Islam in army units because such teaching could boost the morale of the Azerbaijani 
soldiers. 
For the first time in its history, the government of the Azerbaijan People’s Republic 
attempted to elaborate a purely national approach to Islamic traditions that was supposed to 
consider the historical existence of Shi’a and Sunni Azerbaijanis. There is a lack of data about 
exact numbers of Shi’as and Sunnis in Azerbaijan during the early 20th century. Arguably, the 
numbers were largely affected by the fact that from the 15th century the territory of Azerbaijan 
had been the arena of conflicts between the Shi’a Safavi and the Sunni Ottoman rulers. Yet, the 
first historical Azerbaijani state in the 16th century was largely formed as a result of a successful 
mobilization of Turkic tribes under Shi’a concepts of Islam. Its founder, a Sufi convert to Shi’ism, 
Ismail Safavi, proclaimed Shi’ism the official religion of Azerbaijan in 1501.215 In terms of the 
ratio of Shi’as to Sunnis, Audrey Altstadt finds that in the early 1900s, Sunnis generally lived in 
rural areas of Azerbaijan, bordering the Northern Caucasus, from where some of them migrated to 
Baku.216 She mentions that under the Russian rule, Shi’as and Sunnis in Azerbaijan had separate 
ecclesiastical boards. In order to mitigate the inter-confessional divisions between Azerbaijanis, 
the Islamic Spiritual Administration of 1918 was designed to have two equally empowered 
chairs—a Shi’a and a Sunni.217 This act of the government emphasized that in Azerbaijan Islam 
was projected to be subordinate to the interests of a secular nation-state.  
The main legacy of the Azerbaijan People’s Republic was that the secular government of 
Azerbaijan shaped the relationship between religion and state by integrating Islamic values into its 
secular national ideology together with tolerance for other religions. The propaganda of Islamic 
values did not encompass the non-Muslim population of the Azerbaijan People’s Republic. 
Christian pupils studied the Bible in schools; non-Muslims were given the right to study native 
languages and practice religious ceremonies while being exempt from working during their 
religious holidays.218 The government was concerned about the lack of educated Islamic clergy, 
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yet the Azerbaijan People’s Republic’s life was not long enough to practice its policy concerning 
the education of a national clergy. The fall of the Azerbaijan People’s Republic, as a result of the 
Bolshevik invasion in 1920, cut short the formation of the national propaganda strategy with regard 
to religion. The compatibility of Islamic culture and democratic values219 became the main legacy 
of the two years of the Azerbaijani People’s Republic, which Azerbaijani policy makers and 
intellectuals addressed after the country regained independence in 1991.  
B. THE SOVIET PERIOD BEFORE WORLD WAR II 
In order to transform the perceptions of the largely rural population of Russia, the 
Bolsheviks, who came to power in Russia in 1917, vitally needed propaganda and mobilized all 
the available media to meet propaganda goals.220 After the occupation of Azerbaijan in 1920, the 
propaganda methods used by the Bolsheviks on controlled territories widened to Azerbaijan as 
well. The Bolsheviks from Russia shared their expertise with the local Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan 
in the organization of propaganda targeting the Azerbaijani population. 
The Orthodox Church was a supporter of the Russian tsar and the key opponent of the 
Bolshevik ideology in rural Russia. The first Bolshevik anti-religious propaganda body was set up 
as a section of the Commissariat of Justice in 1918221 and was devoted to purely anti-clergy 
propaganda. It published an anti-clergy propaganda journal targeting the Russian peasantry, trying 
not to seem essentially anti-religious.222 By the time of the occupation of Azerbaijan, the Bolshevik 
ideologists had already understood that countering religion resulted in the growing authority of the 
Church.223 Very often the illiterate but pious peasantry rejected their atheism propaganda 
narratives. The Bolsheviks formed so-called agitation trains, which traveled over the former 
empire being decorated and covered with various pictures of modernity, heroic soldiers, peasants 
and workers, and carrying the teams of the Bolshevik propagandists.224 A train named Red East 
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was particularly designed, and its team was equipped to target the Muslim population of Central 
Asia. Subsequently, the initial propaganda of the Bolshevik government in Azerbaijan targeted the 
Azerbaijani population and aimed at compromising the local Islamic clergy. 
Initially, Islam was the greatest challenge for the Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan.225 Similar to 
their activities in Russia, in Azerbaijan, the Bolsheviks’ propaganda declared the narrative of 
“liberation of the peasants’ world view from the rule of religious prejudices.”226 Before the 
invasion, socialist groups in Azerbaijan rallied on the government’s inability to promote reforms 
in the interests of the peasantry.227 After the invasion, the Bolsheviks’ propaganda benefited from 
the grievances of the peasantry. As in other territories under Bolshevik control, an attack against 
class enemies—religious leaders—happened in Azerbaijan.228 The secularity of Azerbaijani 
statehood was already declared during the Azerbaijan People’s Republic in 1918, but the 
Bolsheviks went further in their countering religion. Within the first two weeks of the Bolsheviks’ 
invasion, in May 1920, the new government issued the decree prohibiting religious classes and 
any religious ceremonies in all educational institutions.229 The emphasis on enlightenment allowed 
the Bolsheviks to introduce not only anti-clergy but purely anti-Islamic narratives to the domestic 
audiences. To create stories anchoring the national culture, pamphleteers largely used the 
experience of the Azerbaijani national satiric authors from the Molla Nasreddin magazine of 
earlier times.230 In the late 1920s, the all-Soviet narrative saying that the veil was a symbol of 
backwardness was spread in Azerbaijan.231 While modernism was the main idea of anti-religious 
propaganda narratives in Azerbaijan, anti-clergy stories were based on popular biases and 
anchored people’s feelings of disregard toward some hypocritical clergymen. 
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The Communist governments of Soviet Azerbaijan used various media to spread anti-
religious narratives and stories among the local population. Communist authors wrote various 
works, artists drew caricatures, and movie makers shot movies based on anti-religious stories. 
During the 1920s, several national movies criticizing religion were produced,232 just as the state-
owned newspapers and journals were used for spreading the message. One of the tasks of the 
Communist Youth Union (Komsomol) in the Soviet Union was to struggle against religion in rural 
places.233 In Azerbaijan, some Komsomol propagandists even lost their lives during ideological 
clashes with a pious population.234 To put anti-religious messages into practice, the Soviet 
authorities encouraged the creation of anti-religious societies all over the Soviet Union. The Union 
of Atheists, which waged largely anti-Islam agitation in Azerbaijan in the late 1920s, consisted 
mainly of non-Muslims.235 The Soviet authorities disseminated some of the Azerbaijani anti-
religious propaganda organs, such as Molla Nasreddin magazine, in other Muslim regions of the 
Soviet Union.236 Moreover, the Azerbaijani Communist party’s Women’s Department propagated 
anti-religious narratives of women’s emancipation, such as disapproving of seclusion and 
polygamy, using as a medium the Azerbaijani magazine Women of the East, which was modeled 
after particular all-Soviet magazines printed in Moscow.237 Various women’s clubs and popular 
journals were established to promote women’s social participation. Soviet totalitarian terror forced 
Azerbaijani writers and poets to play important roles in anti-Islamic propaganda. Using movies 
and literature, the Soviet authorities of Azerbaijan disseminated stories that religious holidays were 
unhealthy; instead of religious holidays they introduced the new Communist holidays. Following 
an all-Soviet anti-Islam campaign named hujum (attack),238 in the 1930s, Azerbaijani authorities 
outlawed key Shi’a rituals and Sufi sacred places. From their very first days, the Bolshevik 
governments in Azerbaijan used their total control over all the media to monopolize the 
information realm. 
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The mainly separate Islamic clergymen resisted with their own propaganda against 
Communism. The new regime was proclaimed “the punishment of Allah” and “the end of the 
World”; Shi’a, Sunni, and Sufi leaders called for the unification of all of the Muslims in Azerbaijan 
against the regime.239 Individual clergymen spread various interpretations of Islamic miracles 
among the domestic population as rumors, pumping up people’s interest in religion. The institution 
of so-called pir240 outlived the hardest anti-Islamic periods in Azerbaijan. From time to time 
separate rumors about divine miracles happening at a particular pir enforced an Islamic appeal to 
people, warning them of becoming unbelievers. Even though the Soviet authorities could not 
totally control rumors, they controlled any formal Muslim organizations and the mosques, which 
became the conduits for government propaganda targeting the pious population. During religious 
ceremonies, official clergymen disseminated the message in support of the Soviet regime among 
Muslims. It said that “Allah wanted everyone to be satisfied with his destiny, and the Soviet 
government was the destiny.”241 Yet a religion did not fit into Communist ideology generally. The 
attack on Islam continued, and in the 1930s, the Soviet authorities of Azerbaijan closed the 
mosques and converted their buildings to schools, libraries, and clubs. The stronger totalitarianism 
in Soviet Azerbaijan became, the tougher the government responded to any manifestation of a 
religious propaganda. 
In line with the general Soviet policy, propaganda of the governments of Soviet Azerbaijan 
targeted the populations of Muslim countries, spreading among them narratives of an ideological 
struggle against imperialism. In September of 1920, Baku hosted the “Congress of the People of 
the East,” during which communists and other anti-imperialists discussed their ideological struggle 
against world imperialism.242 At the same time, in order to cut informational interaction of the 
population of Azerbaijan with the Muslim countries,243 the Soviet authorities of Azerbaijan in 
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1924 abandoned the Arabic-based Azerbaijani alphabet in favor of the Latin-based one.244 In 
addition, in order to block any influence on its population from abroad, the Soviet authorities 
prohibited the dissemination of any publications produced by diasporas of the nationalities 
constituting the Soviet Union.245 By contrast, the Soviet authorities used those diasporas in their 
propaganda abroad. These measures were the premises to further distinguishing between the Soviet 
domestic and foreign propaganda narratives.  
The organization of atheism propaganda, the establishment of anti-Islamic narratives, and 
the ban on the Arabic-based Azerbaijani alphabet were the legacies of the early Soviet period in 
Azerbaijan. Even though the trend toward the secularization of Azerbaijani ideology started long 
before the Soviet period, the decisiveness of the Bolsheviks to push any religious appearances out 
of Azerbaijan’s life, together with the harsh measures of the Bolshevik terror against a clergy and 
nationalists, ended the debate between Azerbaijani intellectuals about the role of Islam in 
Azerbaijani ideology. Islam was banned. In addition to that, Azerbaijan got the Latin-based 
alphabet, which local secularists considered as one of the symbols of Europeanization, and 
advocated for it before the establishment of the Soviet regime. 
C. PROPAGANDA IN SOVIET AZERBAIJAN DURING WORLD WAR II AND 
AFTER 
Soon after the beginning of World War II, the overall Soviet propaganda targeting the 
Soviet people was reshaped and included more stories addressing the narratives of patriotism, 
nationalism, and religion than ever before. In his first speech to the Soviet people as the war began, 
the Soviet leader Josef Stalin emphasized the victories of the Great Russian heroes of the past.246 
Yet the most critical shift happened in relation to religion. The Russian Orthodox Church targeted 
the remnants of the pious Orthodox population and disseminated the stories of the anti-Orthodoxy 
nature of Germany’s plans, comparing those plans with other anti-Orthodox attacks, such as the 
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Mongol conquests, historical Teutonic Knights’ and Swedish attacks, as well as the Napoleonic 
invasion.247 The patriotic songs called the Soviet people to the people’s holy war, and the anti-
religious institutions were dissolved. The Soviet Union needed narratives tailored to wider groups 
of people because it was the only way of total mobilization of its population. 
Consequently, during World War II, Soviet authorities elaborated a new religious policy 
of the Soviet Union. To normalize the State’s relationship with religion, the government 
dismantled anti-religious societies and in 1944 created the Council for the Affairs of Religious 
Cults, which had a division related to Islam.248 In the same year, the government of Soviet 
Azerbaijan created the Spiritual Administration of the Transcaucasia Muslims and authorized its 
control over the mosques in the republic.249 Yet, in contrast to the Islamic Spiritual Administration 
of 1918, a Shi’a Muslim chaired the newly established institution, while a Sunni took the deputy 
position. Soviet authorities permitted the opening of Islamic schools, but then, arguing that there 
were no sufficient numbers of applicants in Azerbaijan, obliged local Shi’a scholars to study Sunni 
Islam in institutions functioning in Uzbekistan. Altstadt argues that after the mid-1950s the Soviet 
Union was interested in spreading its influence in the Middle East (including weapon sales to Arab 
states), so its authorities allowed a pilgrimage of some clergymen to Mecca and participation of 
Soviet Muslims in Islamic congresses.250 By doing so in its propaganda targeting Islamic countries, 
the Soviet Union disseminated the narrative of its support for Islam. Meanwhile, despite some 
formal administrative latitudes domestically, the new religious policy was not supposed to allow 
Muslim clergy developing Islamic propaganda in the Soviet Union. 
On the other hand, in Azerbaijan, emphasizing patriotism and national feelings in order to 
boost people’s morale during World War II had unplanned implications after the war. During 
wartime, the patriotic propaganda of Soviet Azerbaijan appealed to the defense of the greater 
homeland, the Soviet Union, and dug into Azerbaijani cultural history.251 This shift in propaganda 
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was not conceived to be a long-term policy because it could result in the increase of Azerbaijani 
nationalism, revealing to the population of Soviet Azerbaijan their cultural closeness to Turkic and 
Islamic civilizations, which possessed values incompatible with Communism. Thus, immediately 
after the war the government of Soviet Azerbaijan reversed wartime propaganda narratives. 
Meanwhile, during the temporary Soviet occupation of the Iranian province of Southern 
Azerbaijan in 1946 Azerbaijanis in Iran and in the Soviet Union got opportunities to interact. 
Farideh Heyat states that despite the fact that contacts between Azerbaijanis could bolster the rise 
of their national awareness, the Soviet Union had to temporarily ease its restrictions as a part of its 
plans for unification of Southern Azerbaijan with Soviet Azerbaijan.252 During that time, the 
Soviets supported independence aspirations of Azerbaijanis in Iran and the government of Soviet 
Azerbaijan played an important role in targeting Azerbaijanis in Iran. She further mentions that 
stories about cultural development in socialist Azerbaijan fascinated compatriots in Iran. 
Eventually, the Republic of South Azerbaijan failed in 1946, and numerous refugees fled to Soviet 
Azerbaijan.253 Those refugees brought with them ideas of unification of the two Azerbaijans that 
bolstered the national feelings in Soviet Azerbaijan. Furthermore, during the “Khrushchev 
thaw”254 of the 1950s, the new authorities of Soviet Azerbaijan succeeded in declaring Azerbaijani 
as the state language in the Constitution of Soviet Azerbaijan.255 Azerbaijani writers of the period 
publicized works reflecting the idea of the national liberation movement in South Azerbaijan. In 
1958, the government established in Soviet Azerbaijan a radio translation on Azerbaijani language 
targeting the Azerbaijani population of Iran.256 The mentioned period largely encouraged 
discussions about national culture and values of Azerbaijan, as well as elaboration of narratives 
and stories related to the division of Azerbaijan into two parts in the 19th century and its 
unification. 
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Furthermore, in the 1950s in order to counter Islamism, the Soviet authorities of Azerbaijan 
used the propaganda of strictly Azerbaijan-oriented national narratives, once again (after the period 
of 1918–1920) giving credence to the formation of the propaganda of Azerbaijanism.257 As a part 
of the anti-Islamic narrative targeting Azerbaijanis, Soviet propaganda encouraged studies about 
Azerbaijani figures who historically opposed Islam.258 Important for Azerbaijani history and 
ethnography, the ancient epos The Book of Dede Korkut, which Soviet propaganda had previously 
considered pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic, was legitimized during the 1950s by citations from Karl 
Marx and references to ancient Russian tales.259 Even though they arguably did not mean to 
propagate nationalism, Azerbaijani authorities who initiated those changes—the First Secretary of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan (CC CPA) Vali Mustafayev (who 
participated in the Soviet infrastructure projects during events in South Azerbaijan), the Chairman 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Mirza Ibrahimov (originally from South Azerbaijan), and 
even the head of the Propaganda Department of the CC CPA Shikhali Kurbanovwere replaced 
in 1959–1961, being labeled by the Soviet leaders as “nationalists and fascists.”260 Regardless of 
the initial aims of the dissemination of the stories about Azerbaijani historical figures, they 
contributed to fostering the national mentality of the whole generation of people of the 1950s. 
Later, some of those people used narratives and stories related to the independence movement in 
South Azerbaijan, as well as those related to Azerbaijanism, laying the foundation for the 
patriotism propaganda of the independent Republic of Azerbaijan. 
After World War II, a variety of new features emerged in anti-religious propaganda in the 
Soviet Union and adopted in Azerbaijan as well. In 1954, a decree of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) criticized the dissemination of the narratives 
and stories insulting clergymen and people practicing religious ceremonies, and called for 
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scientifically valid propaganda aimed at citizens influenced by various religions.261 In accordance 
with the decree, the Communist and Komsomol authorities of the Soviet republics, as well as the 
Ministries of Education and Labor Unions functioning in the republics, were put in charge of 
organizational work; additionally, the media was obliged to publish ideological materials.  
In 1960, a newspaper operated by the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan published an article 
entitled “On the Reactionary Essence of Islam,” attacking the foundation of the religion and 
portraying the Prophet as a plunderer.262 Sometimes the theoretical articles in such key newspapers 
served as talking points for officials, party members, intellectuals, and an educated population. To 
emphasize the key message, the Communist Party’s territorial organs or various representatives 
initiated discussions of those articles in work or education facilities. The Propaganda Department 
of the CC CPA attracted professors of university departments of “Scientific Communism” to 
conduct lectures. According to the aforementioned decree of 1954, the All-union Society for the 
Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge was made responsible for conducting 
propaganda of scientific atheism by organizing lectures and publicizing materials in its magazine 
Science and Religion. Beginning from the mid-1950s in order to prepare propagandists of scientific 
atheism, departments of the Religion and Atheism were established in the universities of the Soviet 
Union.263 The Spiritual Administration of the Transcaucasia Muslims controlled the contents of 
prayers in Azerbaijani mosques, and, in accordance with the scientific approach, banned prayers 
against diseases, though they refrained from outlawing pirs.264 These features of the government’s 
anti-religious propaganda targeting local audiences had been practiced in Azerbaijan until the late 
1980s and, apart from old-fashioned narratives of scientific atheism, continued to influence the 
organization of propaganda after the split of the Soviet Union during the period of independence. 
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During the post-World War II Soviet period, the religious appeal of the local Azerbaijani 
clergy was limited in both the message and the medium; separate clergymen operated 
underground, using the stories describing various miracles and targeting pious and lay people. 
Historically, due to various forms of governmental suppressions, Shi’a and Sufi Islam have 
exploited similar esoteric concepts appealing to individual morality.265 The narratives about 
miracles of curing various diseases by visiting sayyids266 and pirs were merely the only ones 
disconnectedly disseminated by separate clergymen. Those narratives anchored Shi’a or Sufi, not 
Sunni, Islam. Generally, the custom of pilgrimages to the shrines of the Shi’a imams was instituted 
in the mid-900s as a part of Shi’a propaganda, based on the narrative that the imams can produce 
miracles.267 Even though there are not any graves of the Shi’a imams in Azerbaijan, among the 
most significant pilgrimage sites were the graves of the seventh Shi’a imam, Musa Al-Kazim’s 
daughters, Hokuma and Rahima, accordingly in the southern and northern outskirts of Baku. The 
Pir of Rahima in the village of Nardaran contributed to the high level of Shi’a-oriented piety among 
the villagers all through the Soviet period. The notion of miracles attracted vulnerable people to 
Shi’a sites, making them Shi’a by definition, even though most of them were not familiar with 
Shi’a concepts. In the totalitarian society, rumors were the available medium to spread those 
narratives. In its turn, because Sunni Islam does not recognize the divine role of Shi’a imams, 
Sunni clergymen in Azerbaijan could not produce and disseminate similar simple stories about 
miracles. Apparently, lacking a narrative of divine miracles by which to attract people became a 
weakness for the Sunni clergy during the Soviet period in Azerbaijan. 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, it left to Azerbaijan a legacy of the secular society 
heavily affected by emerging nationalism. The Soviet foreign policy in support of Azerbaijani 
national irredentism in Iran in 1946 had a large influence on the formation of the ideology of a 
unified Azerbaijan. But at the same time, the totalitarian propaganda in Soviet Azerbaijan was 
abundant in its control over the media. Part of the Soviet legacy, such as the institutional 
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framework of the government’s propaganda, was not merely useless but also harmful to the future 
democratic development of Azerbaijan.  
D. PROPAGANDA IN THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN 
Starting from the 1950s authorities of Soviet Azerbaijan had supported its writers and poets 
interest in South Azerbaijan. Jamil Hasanli points out that patriotic-themed Azerbaijani literature 
was born after Azerbaijani writer Bakhtiyar Vahabzade wrote his poem “Gulustan” in 1958.268 
The poem rejects the Gulustan agreement269 and in an emotional way questions the right of foreign 
nations (Russia and Iran) to divide Azerbaijan, appealing to historical heroes such as Babak and 
Koroglu,270 formulating the narrative that the Araz River divides the nation and introducing the 
narrative that Tabriz271 is no less Azerbaijan than Baku is. Azerbaijani dissidence of the period 
went even further. The future leader of the People’s Front of Azerbaijan, dissident and historian 
Abulfaz Elchibey, in 1973, speaking to a KGB investigator, openly admitted his goal of unifying 
the two Azerbaijans “after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Iran.”272 His ideas about the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, not those about the unification of Azerbaijans, resulted in his 
imprisonment for a few years under charges of anti-Soviet propaganda. Furthermore, Brenda 
Shaffer finds that speaking to the Writer Congress in 1981, the first secretary of the CC CPA, 
Heydar Aliyev, openly called for the propaganda of South Azerbaijani literature among local 
audiences in Soviet Azerbaijan.273 She further argues that during the revolution in Iran in 1979, 
the press in Soviet Azerbaijan, in contrast to the general Soviet media, framed the events from the 
perspectives of language and cultural rights of Azerbaijanis in Iran. Eventually, by the time 
Azerbaijan became independent, literature and publications had already contributed to the 
formation of the narrative of unification of the Azerbaijans. 
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In 1991, the newly-independent Republic of Azerbaijan proclaimed itself the heir of the 
Azerbaijan People’s Republic of 1918–1920 and readopted most of its symbols. Shaffer calls the 
first years of independence “highly charged ideologically.”274 Former dissident Abulfaz Elchibey 
became the leader of the People’s Front of Azerbaijan, which, in 1989, declared in its program 
“developing cultural ties with Iranian Azerbaijan.”275 In 1987–1990, during the mass protests 
against Armenian allegations on Azerbaijani territories of Nagorno-Karabakh, Bakhtiyar 
Vahabzade often personally proclaimed “Gulustan,” and the Azerbaijani singer from Iran, Yaghub 
Zurufchu, performed the song Ayrilig (separation) which was composed in 1957.276 Later Elchibey 
went further and proclaimed that the pathway to the liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh comes 
through the liberation of Tabriz. During the short term of Elchibey’s presidency in 1992–1993, he 
pushed forward an idea of producing movies about the national independence movement in South 
Azerbaijan. The hostile reaction of Iran was predictable. Thus, the subsequent governments of 
Azerbaijan were more cautious in their narratives related to South Azerbaijan. President of 
Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev (1994–2003), called the Gulustan agreement a national tragedy and 
named the Republic of Azerbaijan a defender of the rights of Azerbaijanis throughout the world.277 
Since then Azerbaijan has organized several world congresses of Azerbaijanis and various cultural 
activities during which authorities have held the main narrative that the Republic of Azerbaijan is 
the heir of the Azerbaijan People’s Republic, but at the same time, it is a homeland for all 
Azerbaijanis of the world. 
Nevertheless, it was not the idea of unification of Azerbaijans but the threat of losing 
Nagorno-Karabakh that mobilized Azerbaijanis in the late 1980s. The Republic of Azerbaijan was 
established under the conditions of ongoing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Since then authorities 
of Azerbaijan have continuously conducted propaganda of patriotism targeting domestic 
audiences. In 1988 the Communist authorities of Azerbaijan not only opposed the separation of 
Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan but also published articles in the Communist press about its 
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historical belonging to Azerbaijan and its culture.278 The subsequent national governments have 
made the narrative only stronger. Since the conflict started in 1987, the main narrative targeting 
both the population of Azerbaijan and generally the people of the world is that Azerbaijan is a 
victim of Armenian aggression, which must be punished.279 It consists of smaller stories such as 
those about the annihilation of the culturally meaningful Topkhana forest by Armenian authorities 
in the Nagorno-Karabakh region in order to build an environmentally hostile aluminum plant in 
the vicinity of Azerbaijani settlements in 1987, the expulsion of Azerbaijanis from Armenia in 
1988, the massacre perpetrated by Armenian forces against a civilian Azerbaijani population of 
the city of Khojaly in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992, and ethnic cleansing and various atrocities 
committed by the Armenian military against Azerbaijanis during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 
1992–1994. From the very first days of the independence of Azerbaijan, the patriotic narratives of 
government propaganda have anchored the defense of the territorial integrity. 
The later stories in support of the main narrative grow in numbers as the conflict continues. 
Thomas De Waal describes them as “narratives of hatred” promoted by both parties of the 
conflict.280 However, in relation to the Armenians as people, government propaganda in 
Azerbaijan has key narratives saying that “Azerbaijan is the homeland of Armenians living in 
Nagorno-Karabakh” and that “Armenians in Karabakh are different from those in Armenia, 
because they, like Azerbaijanis, emanate from the Caucasian Albanians.”281 Along with the 
protracted military conflict, the information war between Armenia and Azerbaijan has continued 
for years, introducing new stories in support of old narratives, new narratives, and counter-
narratives from both sides. Lately, the propaganda of the government of Azerbaijan targeting the 
domestic audience has disseminated counter-narratives arguing that territories of today’s Armenia 
historically belonged to Azerbaijan and conveying the message that Azerbaijanis expelled from 
Armenia in 1988 must be returned to their native lands. 
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Since independence, the successive governments of Azerbaijan have elaborated 
propaganda targeting domestic audiences and consisting of narratives of secularism, 
multiculturalism, and patriotism. The majority of these narratives anchor the historical 
development of Azerbaijani nationhood, in which the period of the Azerbaijan People’s Republic 
of 1918–1920 has a great place. There are a lot of similarities in historical conditions and perceived 
threats to the country. For example, like it was in in 1918, Azerbaijan is in ethnic conflict with 
Armenia nowadays; as it was then, Russia supports Armenia. In addition, Russia, together with 
Iran, is hostile to the independence of Azerbaijan (and to its unification). The legacy of 27 years 
of independence under those conditions is that government of Azerbaijan has propagated 
narratives of patriotism to its population saying that in order to survive the perceived existential 
threats Azerbaijanis should be careful in their fair nationalistic aspirations toward Iran and justified 
anti-imperial sentiments toward Russia. At the same time, Azerbaijanis have to mobilize to support 
the government’s policy aiming at a solution to the imminent threat, which is the Armenian 
occupation of Azerbaijani territories. The perceived existential threat to the nation mobilizes the 
national media in support of the government narratives of patriotism. 
1. Propaganda in Countering Terrorism in Azerbaijan 
Several times, during the 1980s, authorities of the Soviet Union considered that Azerbaijan 
might have faced a rise in Islamic Shi’a extremism. The first time it happened in the aftermath of 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran, given the significant role of Azerbaijanis in the overthrow of the 
Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi.282 During this time, a group of Nardaran villagers created an 
underground “Organization of Khomeini Supporters.”283 As a propaganda response, in 1982, the 
Azerbaijan newspaper Communist blamed Iran for Islamic propaganda in the Soviet republic and 
countered Islamism with national traditions.284 A new anti-Islamic narrative of the time was related 
to Azerbaijan’s pre-Islamic Zoroastrian roots. Years later, the central Soviet government pushed 
forward a similar narrative that the bloody intervention of the Soviet army in Baku on January 20, 
1990, with the aim of suppressing the national independence movement, actually had a goal of 
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defeating Islamic extremism in Soviet Azerbaijan. This time, the leader of the Spiritual 
Administration of the Transcaucasia Muslims, Allahshukur Pashazade, in an open letter responded 
to the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, pointing to the national character of the protests in Azerbaijan and stressing 
that “affiliation with any religion challenges nationalism.”285 In 1990, the political and religious 
authorities of Azerbaijan named the people who died as a result of the Soviet army’s intervention 
shahids (martyrs). A shahid in Islam, though, is “a martyr who has died for the sake of God.”286 
Arguably, this may demonstrate how secular nationalism appropriated religious narratives in 
Azerbaijan, and, moreover, traditional Shi’a and Sunni clergymen submitted to it.  
The majority of cases of Shi’a radicalization in Azerbaijan were linked to Iran’s influence, 
so in those cases, the counterterrorism communication of the government of Azerbaijan largely 
anchored narratives implicitly pointing out the tradition of Iranian hostility toward Azerbaijan. A 
retired security official said that in the 1990s, the Hezbollah terrorist organization’s main efforts 
in Azerbaijan were to consolidate its popular support among Shi’a youth.287 Furthermore, in 
February 1997, members of Hezbollah assassinated Azerbaijani academician Ziya Bunyatov, 
whom they considered to be an agent of the Israeli Mossad and a propagator of Zionism in 
Azerbaijan.288 Several times Iran-oriented289 “Azerbaijan Islamic Party” representatives were 
charged with spying for Iran and sending youngsters to military training in that country (1996),290 
aiming to overthrow the legitimate authorities and establish Shari’a rule in Azerbaijan (2002),291 
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and plotting a terrorist act and attempting to seize power illegally (2011).292 Each time media 
campaigns followed the arrests and trials, yet the media mainly repeated the charges without trying 
to counter the narratives of the Islamists. State-owned media disseminated narratives that a foreign 
country (sometimes Iran was mentioned openly) directed the “Azerbaijan Islamic Party” 
leadership.293 Arguably, authorities presumed that if they linked narratives of the Islamists to Iran, 
those narratives would not resonate with the majority of people in Azerbaijan. 
In addition to that, the press spread the appeal of the Administration of the Caucasus 
Muslims (the successor to the Spiritual Administration of the Transcaucasia Muslims) in support 
of the national interests of Azerbaijan. In November 2015, the Shi’a group “Muslim Unity,” based 
in a village of Nardaran, was accused of acting as an underground religious terrorist group inciting 
revolts with the aim of creating a Shari’a state.294 By 2015, the village of Nardaran became a sort 
of island of pro-Iranian Shi’a radicalization in Azerbaijan. Graffiti-scarred walls in Nardaran read 
“God is the greatest,” and despite the ban on the hijab in the schools of Azerbaijan, in Nardaran 
girls went to schools covered in a hijab.295 In addition to that, during people’s rallies in Nardaran, 
villagers burned flags of the United States, France (as a result of publications in Charlie Hebdo), 
Israel, and Armenia (because it destroyed mosques in occupied territories), protesting the 
denigration of Islamic symbols in Western media.296 This time after the law enforcement 
operation, the government’s media campaign was followed by the announced organization of 
secular life in the village, including conducting several infrastructure and education projects in 
Nardaran, in order to reduce popular support for the radicals. 
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Generally, the narratives of government propaganda in Azerbaijan against Shi’a radicalism 
have been constructed so as not to blame Shi’ism but the anti-Azerbaijan policy of Iran. Interesting, 
but a trend of distinguishing Shi’ism from Iran is not new for Azerbaijan. Beginning from the 19th 
century Azerbaijani Shi’as followed ethnically Azerbaijani Shi’a religious authorities rather than 
Persian ones.297 The Soviet anti-religious policy left Azerbaijan without its own educated Shi’a 
religious authorities. Even though no official census of Shi’as has been conducted in Azerbaijan, 
according to the evaluations of the Administration of the Caucasus Muslims, Shi’as constitute up 
to 65 percent of all Muslims in the country.298 Given the need to hold back pro-Iranian Shi’ism, 
Azerbaijani authorities did not oppose the proselytism of Turkish Sunni groups, including those 
affiliated with Fethullah Gulen.299 Moreover, the Salafi community in Azerbaijan even tried to 
adjust the government’s anti-Iran stories to Salafi’s anti-Shia propaganda, using the radical Salafi 
narratives about paganism inherent in Shi’ism.300 Some representatives of the Salafi clergy in 
Azerbaijan expressed their disapproval that the media in Azerbaijan did not publish articles about 
groups of Azerbaijani Shi’as allegedly fighting together with Iranian groups in Syria on the side 
of the Asad regime.301 Meanwhile, they argued that Azerbaijani media paid undue attention to 
Salafi radicals from Azerbaijan who joined ISIS in Syria. Arguably, linking political activists of 
Islam to Iran may effectively reduce the level of their popular support, due to the widespread 
suspicions in Azerbaijan about Iran’s religious rule. From the other side, by 2001 Azerbaijan had 
closed Iranian religious schools in the country and reportedly had agreed with Iran that it would 
suspend its proselytism targeting Azerbaijani citizens.302 Eventually, the government faced fewer 
challenges in countering pro-Iranian Shi’a propaganda because of that. Domestically in 
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Azerbaijan, Shi’a ideology may be radical or even threatening, given the possibility of open mass 
riots, but it was not a concealed terrorist threat.  
In addition to Shi’a radicalization, during the early 1990s, the history of Salafi infiltration 
of Azerbaijan started. This history was related to the charitable organizations from the Gulf 
countries that began their relief and educational programs in the republic. Charitable foundations 
from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates provided humanitarian aid to 
Azerbaijani refugees, organized religious courses, and supported religious education of 
Azerbaijanis in Islamic universities abroad.303 After they received their Islamic education, those 
Azerbaijanis organized the first Salafi groups in Azerbaijan. In 1997, the Kuwaiti charitable 
organization “Revival of the Islamic Heritage” financed the construction of the Abu Bakr mosque 
in Baku, where Azerbaijani Salafists formed their own community. 
During the same period, Salafi militants infiltrated the wider region of the Caucasus, 
particularly because they took part in the insurgency in Russia’s Republic of Chechnya in the 
Northern Caucasus. The population of Azerbaijani regions bordering the Northern Caucasus 
traditionally follows a Sunni branch of Islam. This made them particularly prone to Salafi 
propaganda, including the one disseminating narratives of jihad in Chechnya. The flow of radical 
Salafists (known as militant Wahhabis) from the Northern Caucasus, as a result of Russian military 
actions against Chechens during 1999–2000, was enforced with the rise in financial aid from the 
Gulf countries to the Salafi community in Azerbaijan.304 At the same time, in 1995, a citizen of 
Egypt, Ibrahim Eidarous, established in Azerbaijan the first jihadist cell, which later merged with 
al-Qaeda.305 Azerbaijani security forces followed the jihadist infiltration of the country, banned 
activities of several charitable foundations and in 1998, together with the Central Intelligence 
Agency, arrested a jihadist from Egypt, Ahmed Mabrouk. Between 1999 and 2001, Azerbaijani 
security forces revealed activities of Salafi terrorist organizations as Jeyshullah (Army of God) 
and Hizb ut-Tahrir.306 Investigations revealed that radical Salafists did not limit their activities to 
support of the Chechen rebels: they planned terrorist acts in Azerbaijan as well. 
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The extradition of some of the terrorists and local trials of others required the authorities 
to explain to the population the threat that radical Salafism posed to Azerbaijan. In 2001, officials 
of the Ministry of National Security spoke about the danger of the spread of Wahhabism in 
Azerbaijan, and the media disseminated stories about visitors to the Abu Bakr mosque who later 
fought in jihad in Chechnya.307 After 9/11, the government of Azerbaijan crushed the Salafi 
communities, and several smaller mosques were closed instantly. Yet the larger one, Abu Bakr, 
functioned up to 2008 when it was also closed. The reason behind the closure was that a group of 
Salafi-jihadists attempted to blow up the mosque as a part of their terrorist plot against other 
Salafists, who did not support militancy. The society in Azerbaijan in general and the media, in 
particular, are not very familiar with the differences between Salafism and Wahhabism. Even 
though Wahhabis follow Salafi Islam, it is their understanding of methods for realization of Salafi 
ideas that can lead to jihad.308 However, from that period, with more or less intensity, the media 
in Azerbaijan generally framed any Salafi activities as radicalism, often naming Salafism as 
Wahhabism. 
In recent years, al-Qaeda and ISIS have recruited some adherents of the Salafi branch from 
Azerbaijan. By 2017, about 900 citizens of Azerbaijan had joined the terrorist organizations.309 
Eighty-four of them returned to Azerbaijan and were arrested. Another 54 of them were deprived 
of their citizenship. Some citizens of Azerbaijan fought in the Northern Caucasus, then took high 
positions in the hierarchy of terrorists in Afghanistan and in late 2012 appeared in Syria.310 In the 
late 2000s, experienced jihadists directed homegrown radical and extremist groups. According to 
various sources, Salafi clergymen in mosques played a significant role in the recruitment of 
jihadists in Azerbaijan, some of whom were promised money for participation in ISIS, as well as 
compensation for their families in the case of death.311 The same source states that on a video 
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disseminated on the Internet, a jihadist from Azerbaijan argued that harsh repression of Salafists 
in Azerbaijan forced some of them to escape to Syria and fight along with ISIS. Some Azerbaijani 
scholars agree that economic grievances and unemployment are among the key causes of an 
increase in ISIS recruitment among Azerbaijanis.312 
Azerbaijan’s set of policies countering terrorism include legislative measures limiting 
dissemination of religious radicalism and government propaganda targeting youth and 
impoverished people. The legislative measures such as a ban on foreigners conducting religious 
propaganda in Azerbaijan, the compulsory registration of religious communities by the State 
Committee for Work with Religious Organizations, and control over religious education by the 
Administration of the Caucasus Muslims have reduced the opportunities for radical Islamic 
propaganda to find a receptive audience.313 The government focuses on conducting educational 
programs that can address the ground for Islamic radicalization, but Azerbaijan lacks programs 
and preventive measures countering radicalization. 
The use of propaganda in countering terrorism is a new realm for the Republic of 
Azerbaijan. Arguably, since 2013 law enforcement has promoted publicity about some Salafists 
who have spoken against jihad in Syria. For example, in 2014, at least two former jihadists 
surprisingly did not encounter legal problems when they returned to Azerbaijan, and at the same 
time, they spoke to the media about their disillusionment because of robberies, murders, and rapes 
committed by ISIS.314 In 2013, the local Salafi clergyman Gamet Suleymanov gave an interview 
for an article in support of countering the jihad narrative, saying that “those who die in Syria can 
possibly not be considered martyrs because they did not follow all the rules associated with 
martyrdom (such as asking their parents for permission).”315 Another story in support of the same 
counterterrorism narrative said that Azerbaijanis should refrain from joining the jihad in Syria and 
better wait until the just war for the liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh started. 
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Within the last few years, larger measures to increase public awareness about the 
radicalization threat were introduced under the auspices of the State Security Service. In March 
2017, a conference on “The Role of The Youth in the Fight against Terrorism, Extremism and 
Radicalism” was held in Baku, where the representatives of the State Security Service, the Youth 
Fund under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry 
of Youth and Sport, and the State Committee for Work with Religious Organizations discussed 
their responsibilities in countering religious radicalism.316 The role of youth was mainly defined 
as a promotion of religious awareness and countering radical propaganda among vulnerable 
populations. Because the government considers the distortion of traditional religious dogma by al-
Qaeda and ISIS as the main cause of terrorists’ ideological inspiration,317 the government’s 
propaganda is focused on countering that distortion. Countering religious extremism and the 
ideologies of terrorist organizations is perceived as the most important part of counterterrorism 
policies in Azerbaijan. 
2. Salafi Propaganda in Azerbaijan 
The key narratives of Salafi propaganda in Azerbaijan anchor the anti-Shi’a sentiment of 
Salafism; but, at the same time, informal Salafi leaders have to be especially cautious in a Shi’a 
majority country when using particular narratives. This thesis supports the view that there are three 
major Salafi factions: “the purists, politicos, and jihadists,” yet “the splits are about contextual 
analysis, not belief.”318 Salafi ideology requires humans to obey Shari’a throughout their entire 
life, rejecting the separation of religion from the state, which is a pillar of Azerbaijan’s constitution. 
Purists in Azerbaijan operate openly and their unofficial leader, Gamet Suleymanov, indignantly 
opposes being associated with Wahhabis.319 When he comments about a daily application of Salafi 
rules, he often touches on sensitive issues like justice and bribes. Yet, Suleymanov does not 
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emphasize “the application of the Salafi creed to the political arena,”320 inherent to the politicos, 
as a solution for societal problems in Azerbaijan. Arguably, because of the Azerbaijani 
government’s intolerance toward any interference of religion into politics, the politicos, even if 
they existed in Azerbaijan, could hardly openly propagate their credo.  
Salafi ideology opposes particular traditions that are deeply rooted in Azerbaijan. One of 
the Salafi pillars—the rejection of “worshipping others than God (shirk)”321—in Azerbaijan 
immediately challenges the foundations of traditional Shi’a Islam, such as the imams and pirs. 
What is even more important, unlike the cautious Shi’a clergymen in Azerbaijan, the Salafi notion 
of shirk unambiguously denies some Azerbaijani key traditions originally rooted in pre-Islamic 
Turkic culture or Zoroastrianism (for example, Nowruz).322 Such conflictual propaganda messages 
are disseminated through the video appeals of the ideologists of global Salafism, translated into 
the Azerbaijani language. Unlike its anti-Shia narrative, the global anti-Iran narrative of the Salafi 
movement is not as alien to Azerbaijani audiences. Iran is fairly blamed for heavily supporting an 
aggressor—Armenia. Although this narrative is not voiced openly by government officials in 
Azerbaijan, it can be heard in a majority of independent media. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is 
depicted in line with cooperative relations and aid programs to Azerbaijan.323 Unlike Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, in solidarity with Azerbaijan, “doesn’t have diplomatic relations with Armenia.”324 In 
Azerbaijan, there are several Internet news outlets, allegedly supported by Salafists, which frame 
the news to undermine the policy of Iran or present negative stories related to it. The Salafi media 
pretend Azerbaijani Salafists’ loyalty to the authorities. Unofficial Salafi leaders residing in 
Azerbaijan have to craft their propaganda in consideration of the prevailing views of Azerbaijanis. 
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In their turn, the narratives of jihadists targeting the Azerbaijani population are entirely 
political and anti-government. First of all, their emphasis on al-Wala wa-l-Bara makes jihadists 
different from other Salafists,325 because it rejects religious tolerance, one of the pillars of 
government propaganda in Azerbaijan. Yet al-Qaeda’s jihadist appeal varies from that of ISIS. In 
2015, for example, one of the Azerbaijani fighters of an al-Qaeda affiliated group in Syria declared 
that their aim in Azerbaijan was to propagate Islam, not to make jihad.326 Generally, Azerbaijani 
fighters in ISIS have also called their supporters to join the jihad in Syria,327 reflecting the official 
ISIS propaganda narrative about the alluring caliphate. At the same time, however, some 
Azerbaijani ISIS members, via social networks, have openly threatened Shi’as in Azerbaijan, 
called them apostates, and invited other Azerbaijani Salafists to fight them in the country.328 
Terrorist threats to assassinate particular Shi’a clergymen have also been made.329 Jihadist adepts 
promised to destroy Shi’a pirs in Azerbaijan and justified the destruction of mosques by Armenians 
in occupied Karabakh because those mosques were named after Shi’a imams. Furthermore, some 
jihadists accused Azerbaijani Salafists who refused to join ISIS of infidelity as well.330 Arguably, 
such an extremist propaganda not only faces the most severe response from the authorities, but it 
also meets resistance from the hearts and minds of its intended audience, unless that audience is 
already radicalized. 
At the present time, the only Salafi propaganda tolerated by Azerbaijani authorities is that 
controlled by Gamet Suleymanov, the unofficial Salafi leader, which centers on education and 
purification. During the early 1990s, his Friday sermons and lectures and those of some other 
Salafi preachers were disseminated on CDs.331 In 2003, informal Salafi groups in Azerbaijan 
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established an online forum for the Abu Bakr mosque. In time, social media became an important 
way of communicating Salafi ideas in Azerbaijan. The closure of Salafi mosques was followed by 
the introduction of a practice whereby Salafi propagandists traveled around the country and met 
with their supporters personally.332 These meetings were recorded and placed on the Internet. 
Eventually, in 2014, an Internet news agency, Salaf Xeber, under the control of Gamet Suleymanov 
was created in Azerbaijan. He claimed that the Salafists in Azerbaijan needed their own news 
media because the domestic media sometimes distorted their interviews.333 Through the Internet 
news portal Salaf Xeber and YouTube channel, materials prepared under Gamet Suleymanov’s 
control,334 his personal speeches in mosques and videos, where he answers questions of his 
supporters, target domestic audiences in Azerbaijan.  
Nevertheless, Salafi-jihadists could hardly be allowed to operate as openly as the purist 
Salafists did. Because many Azerbaijanis speak Turkish and Russian, however, they were able to 
access much of the jihadist online propaganda.335 During the heyday of ISIS from 2012 to 2014, a 
number of videos of Azerbaijani jihadists appealing to their compatriots and promoting life in the 
caliphate were disseminated online. The media in Azerbaijan does not broadcast jihadists’ videos, 
because it may be considered propagating appeals to terrorism; thus, social networks continue to 
be the only way for jihadists to reach potential supporters. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the historical development of propaganda during the Azerbaijan 
People’s Republic of 1918–1920, Soviet Azerbaijan of 1920–1991, and the Republic of Azerbaijan 
after 1991. The research followed the roots of government relations with Islam as a way to reveal 
the emergence of the ideology of Azerbaijanism and the narratives of patriotism, multiculturalism, 
and religious tolerance in the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
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Turkism, Modernism, and Islamism underlie the fundamental ideology of Azerbaijan. 
During the short period of independence in 1918–1920, the national government concluded 
previous debates and proclaimed the secular character of Azerbaijani statehood while also 
recognizing the right to appeal to the traditional Shi’a and Sunni branches of Islam, as well as other 
non-Islamic religions. The authorities of Soviet Azerbaijan initially exploited the foundations of 
secularism left from the national government.  
One of the main lessons that the anti-religious propaganda of Soviet Azerbaijan reveals is 
that appeals to rationality are not very useful in countering emotional beliefs in God. The 
communist authorities of Azerbaijan formulated narratives of atheism, modernization, 
enlightenment, and emancipation; nevertheless, people (including communists) continued to visit 
pirs and conduct parallel Islamic ceremonies during marriages and funerals. Communists deprived 
clergymen of mosquesIslam “went underground”336and its propaganda relied on rumors, 
becoming even less vulnerable to the state apparatus. Arguably, the goal of Soviet Azerbaijan 
propagandaa total elimination of religion from Azerbaijani societywas unreachable; 
moreover, the use of scientific atheism as an anchor for propaganda narratives intended to convince 
the public to abandon their religious practices and belief was not effective. 
At the same time, the anti-religious propaganda of the Soviet Union reinforced the national 
realm of Azerbaijani ideology. The Soviets exploited Azerbaijani culture and nationalism and 
supported Azerbaijani irredentism in Iran, even with no success in separating South Azerbaijan 
from Iran in 1946. However, by playing with Azerbaijani nationalism in the interests of foreign 
policy, the Soviet Union largely contributed to the growth of Azerbaijani national culture 
domestically. After that, propaganda in Soviet Azerbaijan and subsequently in independent 
Azerbaijan has always included narratives related to the unity of Azerbaijanis living on both sides 
of the divisive Araz River. Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan made the propaganda of 
patriotism an important policy for Azerbaijani governments. Meanwhile, its narratives related to 
ethnic conflict anchor the notions of the Azerbaijan People’s Republic, which respected all the 
religious and ethnic groups inhabiting Azerbaijan. 
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The state propaganda for countering terrorism in Azerbaijan addresses various threats from 
religious extremism. The policy of exporting the Islamic revolution from neighboring Iran, 
together with common religious grounds, presents a risk of Shi’a radicalization. However, the 
sense of nationalism of Azerbaijanis is the key obstacle preventing the export of Iranian ideas to 
Azerbaijan. In contrast, narratives of Azerbaijani national propaganda, if they targeted 
Azerbaijanis in Iran, may gain more success. Salafi extremism and jihadist propaganda are 
immediate dangers for Azerbaijan. Even purist Salafi propaganda narratives challenge the peaceful 
coexistence of various branches of Islam and other religions in Azerbaijan. Overall, the 
informational realm in Azerbaijan does not favor Salafism. Although this is due in part to past and 
current government activities, it is mainly due to cultural alienation and the frequently expressed 
view that Salafism is linked directly to the atrocities committed by ISIS. The government 
understands the necessity of preventive ideological measures against radicalization. But, 
addressing the rise of ISIS propaganda requires more sophisticated policies incorporating the 















This chapter compares and contrasts the historical development of strategic communication 
targeting domestic audiences in the United States and Azerbaijan and the application of these 
methods in counterterrorism policies of the respective countries. Furthermore, the analysis 
highlights the weak and strong points in each of the cases. Therefore, the chapter starts by 
synthesizing strategic communication in the United States, followed by a synthesis of propaganda 
in Azerbaijan. I draw policy parallels and divisions in order to find which common and different 
applications are present in the respective countries. Then I elaborate on the general approaches 
that can help strengthen strategic communication in countering terrorism that targets domestic 
audiences. 
The policy of domestic-oriented strategic communication in the United States developed 
during the World Wars of the 20th century and became an important tool in countering terrorism 
in the 21st century. The values of American liberty restrained the federal government from the 
wider application of domestic- oriented propaganda. Threats of homegrown Islamic radicalization, 
however, made American policy makers recognize the need for particular government institutions 
to use strategic communication targeting the American audience in order to make the country safer 
from ISIS. As a result, the United States worked out its institutional framework and democratic 
restraints on a policy of strategic communication targeting domestic audiences. 
In the 20th century, under various political regimes, the governments of Azerbaijan 
conducted propaganda campaigns targeting domestic audiences in order to, among other aims, 
influence the local population’s attitudes toward Islam. Eventually, Azerbaijan developed 
narratives of religious tolerance. At the same time, domestic propaganda in Azerbaijan largely 
developed its framework under totalitarianism. Because Azerbaijan faces what is perceived to be 
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an existential threat to its statehood,337 the news media is highly compliant with the government’s 
calls to patriotism-supportive coverage. However, the perceived existential threats do not include 
the religious radicalization leading to terrorist recruitment. Thus in addition to its narratives, 
Azerbaijani may need application of experiences from advanced countries in how to build a 
functional institutional framework of domestic propaganda countering terrorist recruitment. 
A. SYNTHESIS OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION COUNTERING 
TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 
During the 20th century, the American policy makers had alternately allowed and then 
restricted federal agencies from employing strategic communication directed at domestic 
audiences. In particular, when the United States was at war, the need for strategic communication 
targeting domestic audiences was urgent. During those periods, the American government 
enhanced the set of policies that later defined strategic communication. During the interwar period, 
the American public continuously disavowed their government’s use of propaganda domestically, 
but scholars preserved the valuable experience and practice gained by the CPI and OWI. Then, 
when the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (the Smith–Mundt Act) 
officially delegitimized the American government’s use of propaganda domestically, major news 
media and commercial businesses stepped in to produce domestic propaganda instead. Being 
constrained to target only foreign audiences, the American government’s strategic communication 
shifted its focus and continued to evolve, particularly in relation to adjusting American narratives 
directed at various cultures of different nation-states. 
During the two World Wars, strategic communication established itself as a complement 
to conventional warfare. During the Cold War, strategic communication became a separate type 
of warfare, a war of ideas, which promised far less devastation than a nuclear war between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The United States reached the period of the War on Terror 
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with the legacy of strategic communication limited to targeting foreign audiences. Initially, 
American strategic communication targeting the general public was a part of the attack on 
terrorism. The United States disseminated the clear narrative that it was going to fight terrorism 
around the world and the American military supported it. The United States has won significant 
victories over al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and ISIS in Syria, imprisoned or killed “scoundrels,” such 
as Khalid Mohammed, Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, and other leaders and propagandists 
of al-Qaeda and ISIS. At the same time, the War on Terror has required American policy makers 
and legislators to reassess the application of strategic communication relative to new threats posed 
by the penetration of radical and violent ideology into American society. 
That being the case, the rise of jihadist propaganda that promotes violent extremism has 
changed the American model of strategic communication targeting domestic audiences during 
short periods of crises. In recognition of the Department of State’s overseas efforts aiming to 
counter the propaganda of Islamic radicalization, in 2012, the U.S. Congress modernized the 
Smith–Mundt Act and authorized the domestic dissemination of information prepared by the 
Department of State for foreign audiences. Government-controlled strategic communication 
targeting the domestic American audience soon forced its way into becoming legitimate policy 
under a variety of definitions, such as “global engagement,” “community partnership” and 
“countering violent extremism efforts.” Now, U.S. federal agencies such as the Department of 
State, the FBI, and DHS have authorities and operate bodies which, in one way or another, 
deliberately disseminate information among American residents in the interests of the wider 
counterterrorism perspective. 
Furthermore, the emergence of ISIS has complicated the American counterterrorist 
response, whose appeal must be greater than the tactics of inspiration employed by terrorists. 
ISIS’s practice of online propaganda and recruitment in social networks sufficiently reduced the 
need for terrorist-recruiters to meet with their targets in person while still maintaining a sense of 
immediacy. Despite its recent military losses, for example, ISIS preserves its inspiration-based 
power. The American government recognizes that even after the loss of territories, ISIS will 
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continue to present a terrorist threat to the United States.338 Propaganda materials produced by 
ISIS ideologists have continued to inspire potential supporters to terrorism in the United States 
even after those ideologists were physically destroyed by the U.S. military. Undoubtedly, the 
application of the American military force and its intelligence capabilities will lead to the physical 
defeat of larger terrorist structures. On the other hand, the inspirational legacy of ISIS has widened 
the separate front of counterterrorism: the war on violent ideas.339 Arguably, there is a narrative of 
hope in the radical Islamists’ saying that “America can never kill ideas of al-Awlaki.”340 Indeed, 
the war on ideas is going to continue for a longer time because ideas do not die promptly together 
with their authors. 
On the other hand, ideas might lose their attractiveness if they are consciously and 
effectively undermined. It requires from the United States coordinated activities incorporating 
legislative support and the experience of law enforcement agencies, the Intelligence Community, 
and think tanks. Countering violent ideas among American residents requires the systematic 
governmental application of strategic communication targeting domestic audiences. The DHS 
Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism states that local communities are the most effective 
government partners in countering terrorist recruitment.341 The American military power granted 
the military success over ISIS, but the further advance on countering terrorism additionally 
requires overpowering radical propaganda and making ISIS’s powerits ideasirrelevant. 
B. SYNTHESIS OF PROPAGANDA COUNTERING TERRORISM IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN 
The traditions of propaganda342 targeting domestic audiences in Azerbaijan have 
developed in the 20th century under two sets of conditionsperiods of independence and Soviet 
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totalitarianism. During both periods of independence (i.e., 1918–1920 and 1991–present) 
Azerbaijan has faced similar threats to its territorial integrity, which has contributed to a similarity 
in the government’s domestic propaganda narratives. Totalitarian domestic propaganda was 
introduced in the period when Azerbaijan was part of the Soviet Union (1920–1991). As opposed 
to the United States, where domestic strategic communication complemented wartime efforts, in 
Soviet Azerbaijan domestic propaganda was a wholly penetrative policy. The Soviet period’s 
domestic propaganda of atheism sufficiently enforced Azerbaijani society’s absorption of anti-
religious narratives. Furthermore, the final development of the narrative of unity of Azerbaijanis 
who live in the Republic of Azerbaijan with those who live in Southern Azerbaijan343 should also 
be attributed to the propaganda of the Soviet period. As a result of the Soviet era measures, Islam 
in Azerbaijan lost its emotional religious appeal.344 By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, Soviet 
Azerbaijan’s propaganda of scientific atheism and cultural nationalism significantly influenced 
people’s beliefs.345 Consequently, the next governments of the Republic of Azerbaijan did not face 
challenges in disseminating narratives of religious tolerance and political secularism among the 
population. 
The Azerbaijani national government domestic propaganda uses narratives of dogmatic 
adherence to territorial integrity, which for the time being reduces the meaning of actual patriotism. 
Neighboring Armenia occupies346 the Azerbaijani territories of Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2005, the 
                                                 
343 According to the Gulustan (1813) and Turkmanchay (1828) agreements, which ended the Russo-Persian 
War, Russia took control over parts of Persia’s Caucasian territories. The new border between Russia and Persia 
divided historical Azerbaijan into two parts by the river of Araz. The divided parts became unofficially known as 
Northern and Southern Azerbaijan. The actual Republic of Azerbaijan is based on the territories of Northern 
Azerbaijan. Southern Azerbaijan includes the four Iranian provinces of Eastern Azerbaijan, Western Azerbaijan, 
Ardebil, and Zanjan, and parts of the provinces of Gilan and Hamadan. 
344 Sattarov, Islam, State, and Society in Independent Azerbaijan, 70. 
345 Various stories of heroes permeated from the historical pasts of nations constituting the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, and were compiled to highlight the essence of class struggle of Leninism. 
346 Nagorno-Karabakh has always been a part of Azerbaijan (see more at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/print_aj.html). Following the conflict between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh was reaffirmed as territory of 
Azerbaijan by the United Nations, which adopted four Security Council resolutions demanding the withdrawal of 
occupying forces from the Azerbaijani region (see more at https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/13508.htm); 
furthermore, in a 2015 draft resolution, the Political Affairs Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE) called for “the withdrawal of Armenian armed forces and other irregular armed forces 
from Nagorno-Karabakh and the other occupied territories of Azerbaijan, and the establishment of full sovereignty 
of Azerbaijan in these territories,” in the framework of the OSCE Minsk process (see more at 
http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-EN.asp?newsid=5862&lang=2&cat= ). 
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“Report of the OSCE Fact-Finding Mission to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding 
Nagorno-Karabakh” found that the Armenian diaspora and authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh had 
organized resettlement of the population from Armenia on those territories.347 Armenian 
authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have destroyed or changed the historical facts on the ground 
speaking in favor of the Azerbaijani ownership of the Karabakh region’s authentic Caucasian 
culture and ancient Christian religious heritage. Meanwhile, Caucasian culture and ancient 
Christian heritage feed narratives of Azerbaijani multiculturalism and religious tolerance, which 
in their turn constitute inseparable parts of the prevalent ideology of Azerbaijanism.348 In 
accordance with Azerbaijanism, Azerbaijan is secular not only because of the influence of Turkism 
or its people’s traditional European aspirations, but also because of the mixed origins of 
Azerbaijanis. Yet, the prolonged war with Armenia causes the aforementioned dogmatism and 
subjugates narratives of multiculturalism and religious tolerance toward all groups of people to the 
greater narrative of patriotism.  
Against this background, there are two separate dimensions of the threat related to the 
religious radicalization in Azerbaijan, both driven by external forces. One of them is pro-Iranian 
Shi’a radicalism and extremism. Iran conducts propaganda targeting the Shi’a audience, 
constituting a majority among the Muslim population of Azerbaijan. As part of this propaganda, 
Azerbaijani clergymen in Iran have disseminated narratives against the separation of state and 
religion in the Republic of Azerbaijan, and for the unification of Azerbaijans within Iran.349 The 
radical Shi’a propagandists mainly use the Internet and social media, as well as pro-Iranian clergy 
operating in mosques, to spread its ideas among various audiences, including but not limited to 
those who are unsatisfied with their social conditions. The narratives of global Shi’ism are rooted 
in the Shi’a Imam Hussain’s self-sacrificing struggle for bringing justice to the poor and oppressed 
people. In Azerbaijan, radical Shi’a propaganda narratives declare that the creation of a socially 
just Shari’a state is a solution for the social grievances of people. The aim of this type of 
propaganda is the wider social and political mobilization of Shi’as in Azerbaijan. Some of the key 
                                                 
347 “Report of the OSCE Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding 
Nagorno-Karabakh (NK),” European Parliament, April 16, 2018, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/dsca20050413_08/dsca20050413_08en.pdf. 
348 Shaffer, Borders and Brethren, 157. 
349 Shaffer, Borders and Brethren, 187–188. 
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stories of the pro-Iranian conduits are opposition to the state’s restriction of wearing the hijab in 
schools and condemnation of the demolition of several small mosques.350 At the same time, pro-
Iranian propagandists have disseminated extreme anti-Western narratives, reflecting the anti-
America and anti-Israel stance of the Islamic Republic of Iran among limited groups of radicalized 
Azerbaijani Shi’as. 
In Azerbaijan, the prevailing public mood does not favor much of the pro-Iranian 
propaganda because of the unattractiveness of the Iranian religious state model. The prevailing 
anti-Iranian attitudes of the majority of Azerbaijanis are based on the suppression of Azerbaijani 
national culture and language in Iran. Moreover, Shaffer stresses that the traditions of Azerbaijani 
secularism attract not only Azerbaijanis from Iran, but also other Iranians as well.351 She argues 
that in the region radical Shi’a ideology could hardly win the intellectual battle against secularism. 
Eventually, in Azerbaijan, the power of radical Shi’a narratives is limited whenever their link to 
Iran becomes apparent. 
Salafi propaganda is another external threat of religious radicalization in Azerbaijan. As in 
other countries Salafists in Azerbaijan identify themselves as Sunnis. However, a large number of 
Azerbaijanis do not classify newly evolved Salafists with traditional Sunnis.352 Generally, Salafi 
tradition is closer to the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. By contrast, Sunnis in Azerbaijan, as do 
those in Turkey, mainly follow the Hanafi and to some degree the Shafi’i schools of Sunni Islam, 
as do those in the Northern Caucasus. Unlike Azerbaijani Sunnis’ ultimate tolerance of Shi’as in 
the country, Salafi ideology in its essence is hostile to Shi’a beliefs.353 In addition, Salafists reject 
                                                 
350 During the early years of independence, there were cases when mainly individuals built mosques on their 
private lands, intended for housing purposes. Owners assigned clergymen to lead religious ceremonies in such 
mosques. While some of those owners later passed the religious control over the mosques to the Administration of 
the Caucasus Muslims, some others did not. Eventually, the government decided to demolish a few of the mosques, 
justifying the decision, saying the mosques lacked the necessary construction permits. The government also allowed 
the demolition of a few of the official mosques during infrastructure construction projects. Each time government 
officials offered the people who used the demolished mosque an alternative newly built mosque. 
351 Shaffer, Borders and Brethren, 207. 
352 Non-recognition of Salafis as Sunnis is a notion that is inherent also to some Muslim clergy in the Northern 
Caucasus. In late August 2016, the authorities of the Chechen Republic of Russia organized in its capital city 
Grozny an international Islamic conference. During the conference the Islamic scholars from Russia, Egypt, Yemen, 
and Syria determined that Salafis and Wahhabis should not be considered Sunnis (see more at: Yaroslav Trofimov, 
“Split in Sunni Islam Threatens Saudi Influence,” Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2016, ProQuest.) 
353 Maher, Salafi-Jihadism, 103. 
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pre-Islamic Azerbaijani cultural and national traditions. Beginning from the early 1990s, several 
benevolent foundations from the Gulf countries propagated Salafi Islam as a part of their aid 
programs targeting the young and Azerbaijani refugees from the occupied territories. The emphasis 
on humanitarian aid allowed Salafi propagandists to recruit supporters among both Shi’a and Sunni 
communities of Azerbaijan. Then, Azerbaijani converts openly propagated Salafism in small 
groups and mosques. The distinctive feature of the Salafi propaganda campaign targeting 
Azerbaijan’s population has been its reluctance to criticize and confront the authorities over any 
significant issues.  
Even though no official data about the numbers of Salafists in Azerbaijan is available,354 
their community has grown remarkably among the extremely pious population of the country. As 
a legacy of the Soviet era propaganda of atheism, Azerbaijanis have not deeply educated about the 
pillars of Shi’a or Sunni ideologies. Most Azerbaijanis consider themselves Shi’a or Sunni because 
of the influence of their parents and grandparents. Arguably, the numbers showing a Shi’a majority 
of 65 percent do not necessarily mean that all those Shi’as are full-time practicing Muslims. The 
same can be said of traditional Sunnis. However, being Salafi in Azerbaijan presumes practicing 
that branch of Islam fully. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the population of Azerbaijan 
showed interest in the revival of their Islamic values. Mostly religiously uneducated local Shi’a 
and Sunni clergymen were not able to provide essentially educated Azerbaijanis with solid 
religious knowledge. Salafi converts caught the moment, introduced the “bookish” Islam, and 
often succeeded in out-arguing the traditional clergymen in religious debates.355 Meanwhile, 
charitable organizations from the Gulf countries helped Azerbaijanis to study in Islamic 
universities following Salafi traditions. The most widespread explanation for Azerbaijanis’ 
conversion to Salafism speak in favor of Salafi propagandists’ financial capabilities and theoretical 
preparedness.356 Eventually, Salafi propagandists managed to persuade people ceremonially 
affiliated with Shi’ism or Sunnism, other religions, or with an atheist background to full-heartedly 
practice Islam as Salafists. 
                                                 
354 Governments of Azerbaijan have never conducted a census based on religious affiliation. Usually informal 
religious leaders or experts have brought different uncited numbers of Salafis in Azerbaijan, varying from 10,000 to 
80,000, what roughly constitutes from 0.1 percent to 0.8 percent of the Muslims in the country. 
355 Gasimov, “Multimodal Salafi Engagement with Digital Media in Azerbaijan.” 
356 International Crises Group, Azerbaijan: Independent Islam and The State. 
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Yet, from the late 1990s, the propaganda of jihadism has developed in Azerbaijan as well. 
The evolution of some Salafists to jihadists in Azerbaijan happened under the external influence 
of al-Qaeda activities in the Northern Caucasus. Initially, Salafi-jihadists from the regions of 
Azerbaijan bordering the Northern Caucasus took part in the war of Chechens against Russia, and 
then more Azerbaijanis joined the war in Afghanistan and eventually appeared in Iraq and Syria. 
Jihad propagandists have recruited supporters among Azerbaijani Salafists who faced social 
problems or were alienated by the government’s harsh stance on Salafism in general. Along with 
the narratives of global jihadism, such as praising life in the Islamic State and accusing Shi’as of 
apostasy, jihadist propaganda in Azerbaijan opposes the government because of its cooperation 
with Western countries, the popularization of European culture, and the alleged suppression of 
Islam. At the same time, jihadists threaten Shi’a clergymen by committing terrorist acts against 
them. 
Even though the propaganda of purist Salafists and jihadists use the same Salafi ideology, 
their propagandists cannot use the same conduits. Azerbaijani purist Salafists own Internet sites 
and news agencies, systematically gather in particular mosques, and openly disseminate their 
narratives in social media. Purist Salafists do their utmost not to be linked to jihadism. Moreover, 
the purists have used their media and Internet sites to debate with jihadists and disseminate 
narratives rejecting the terrorists’ anti-government appeals targeting Azerbaijanis.357 Being 
formally rejected by the purist Salafists, jihadi propagandists mainly rely on social networks. The 
Azerbaijani Constitution and Criminal Code, however, outlaw any types of propaganda of violence 
and terrorism. Thus jihadists either do not reveal their personality or operate from the places 
beyond the control of Azerbaijani law enforcement. The fact that the government of Azerbaijan 
has been intolerant of religious radicalism limits Salafists overall in their use of media based in the 
country. 
On the other hand, the government of Azerbaijan has administrative experience in 
countering homegrown violent extremism and fighting terrorism, but propaganda targeting 
domestic audiences as a part of counterterrorism is a rather new realm for the country. Starting 
from the mid-1990s, several administrations have conducted a series of law enforcement 
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operations and promoted legislative measures to disrupt pro-Iranian Shi’a extremism. The law 
enforcement agencies have investigated several cases of Hezbollah-directed terrorist acts and 
plots. Media campaigns that followed the law enforcement operations revealed the external 
influence of extremists and linked their activities to the establishment of an Iranian-like regime in 
Azerbaijan. Recently, after the law enforcement operations against Shi’a extremists in a 
traditionally religious village of Nardaran near Baku, the government has improved educational 
and infrastructure conditions in the village in order to mitigate foundations for radicalization. 
The state’s response to Salafi radicalization has been even tougher than on Shi’a extremism 
mainly because the radical form of SalafismWahhabismdemonstrated an imminent terrorist 
threat in the example of the Northern Caucasus and later with regard to the 9/11 attacks. Starting 
from the late 1990s, government and security officials in their public interviews did not distinguish 
between purist and violent Salafists, pointing to the terrorist threat that the supporters of 
Wahhabism posed to Azerbaijan. The media did not make the distinction either. Eventually, the 
counter-Wahhabism campaign covered all the supporters of Salafi branch in Azerbaijan. The 
nearly singular narrative was that Wahhabism (Salafism, jihadism) was equal to terrorism. In order 
to counter Wahhabism ideologically, Azerbaijan has worked out narratives anchoring 
multiculturalism and targeting domestic audiences. Lately, the government’s programs on 
education, work with youth and religious organizations, together with law enforcement, have 
increased their focus on propaganda against violent extremism. In order to advance in the war of 
ideas, the Azerbaijani government may need to apply the best international experience of 
organizing credible and persuasive propaganda targeting domestic audiences. 
C. POLICY PARALLELS 
I draw policy parallels between domestic strategic communication in the United States and 
propaganda in Azerbaijan relative to the periods when the countries faced similar historical 
conditions, that is, during crises and wars. Firstly, the mobilization of domestic audiences to 
emotionally support government narratives is common to both countries during crises. Secondly, 
a centralized government institution conducting domestic strategic communication exists in both 
countries. Finally, the counterterrorism responses of both countries use similar narratives of 
religious tolerance and rejection of violent extremism. 
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During the crises of the 20th century, the governments of the United States and Azerbaijan 
favored the emotionally appealing patriotic narratives in domestic propaganda. The CPI created a 
war psychology in the United States during World War I.358 During World War II the American 
administration used the narrative of a war of ideology and a story that “Germany was an existential 
threat to Europe and thus to the United States as well” in order to focus Americans’ attention on 
foreign policy issues.359 An all-Soviet total war psychology and a narrative of a war against the 
ideology of fascism covered Azerbaijan’s population during World War II. At times, Azerbaijan’s 
propaganda of patriotism has shifted to total war psychology, as it did during the hot phases of the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Atrocity stories as a means of discrediting 
the enemy were a feature of American propaganda during World War I.360 This approach was 
honed during World War II when American propaganda portrayed Hitler as a composite character 
of the Nazi threat.361 In a like manner, during the latest clashes on the Karabakh front in 2016, an 
emotional appeal for retribution became apparent in Azerbaijan again.362 Azerbaijan’s propaganda 
has often portrayed Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian as a symbol of the Armenian cruelty 
toward Azerbaijanis.363 Both the United States and Azerbaijan have used propaganda narratives 
targeting domestic audiences and emphasizing their adversary’s cruelty in order to mobilize public 
support for wars. 
The centralization of strategic communication intended for the domestic audience in the 
United States during the World Wars and its generally centralized character in Azerbaijan is 
another parallel. Historically, the United States had specific federal entities like the CPI and OWI 
that were responsible for strategic communication (though during limited time periods). Likewise, 
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during the Soviet period, there was a specific propaganda department in the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party in Azerbaijan. After World War II, the White House communications staff 
had demonstrated an interest in framing the news agenda in the United States. Similarly, during 
the independence period in Azerbaijan, the presidential administration generally has tried to set a 
news agenda in relation to the critical events, even though there is no particular department of 
propaganda. 
The use of domestic strategic communication as a counterterrorist response is the most 
recent example of a parallel policy in the United States and Azerbaijan. In both countries the 
strategy aims to counter the same enemyIslamic radicalization leading to terrorism. The United 
States applies CVE activities in order to disrupt terrorist recruitment. At the same time, the United 
States’ message advocates for religious tolerance. Lately, Azerbaijan has recognized the 
significance of countering radicalization among youth and vulnerable groups of the population. 
Similarly, Azerbaijani narratives of multiculturalism are based on the idea of religious tolerance. 
The U.S. government bodies also fund projects that promote the elaboration of these narratives 
and active community engagement in order to counter radical propaganda online. By the same 
token, the government of Azerbaijan has started programs in the field of education, youth affairs, 
and religion aiming at increasing the engagement of particular groups in activities of disseminating 
narratives of multiculturalism.  
D. POLICY DIVISIONS 
This thesis has identified that during the 20th century differences in, on the one side, 
application of strategic communication within the United States and, on another side, propaganda 
in Azerbaijan, have emanated from their temporary exigency and, respectively, constant character. 
The various U.S. administrations applied strategic communication only during crises, by 
disseminating the narrative of the American exceptionalism and therefore appealing to the 
responsibility of Americans to spread democracy to the world. In contrast, during the 20th century, 
various Azerbaijani administrations applied propaganda constantly, either justifying its importance 
by a perceived existential threat to the statehood or having propaganda as a constituent part of the 
Soviet totalitarian policy. Consequently, the aforementioned differences influenced how the 
governments in the United States and Azerbaijan engaged the media in their strategic 
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communication. The new threat of Islamic extremism that both countries face not only highlights 
their common policy approaches (which this chapter has previously discussed) but also reveals the 
specificities of the application of strategic communication in counterterrorism. These differences 
emanate from the different religious contexts that impact the scale of the target audiences and the 
governments’ stances toward Islam.  
Even though propaganda has been used as a crisis measure by both governments, the 
different perceptions of crises in the United States and Azerbaijan have influenced the duration of 
each government’s propaganda campaign. In the United States, the World Wars temporarily 
allowed administrations to use propaganda targeting domestic audiences. American public 
opinion, though, often criticized the use of propaganda even during crisis periods. After the crises 
ended, propaganda organs, such as the CPI and the OWI, were immediately dismantled. Moreover, 
in 1948, the Smith–Mundt Act limited the U.S. government’s informational activities by targeting 
only foreign audiences. In contrast, Azerbaijan’s legislature has not limited its government’s 
dissemination of propaganda in Azerbaijan has had a continuous character. The Azerbaijan 
People’s Republic of 1918–1920 existed under the permanent threat of occupation, and the 
Republic of Azerbaijan after 1991 has an unresolved territorial dispute with Armenia. Moreover, 
in Soviet Azerbaijan, domestic propaganda was a significant tool for the totalitarian regime. 
Eventually, the Azerbaijani public did not question the government’s right to conduct propaganda 
campaigns targeting the domestic audience. Unlike in the United States, propaganda targeting 
domestic audiences is not a provisional crisis measure in Azerbaijan; it is the government’s 
permanent instrument to deal with the continuous perceived existential crisis. In addition, the 
different context of the application of strategic communication, or “prevailing public mood,”364 in 
the United States and Azerbaijan has impacted the two countries’ governments approach to 
crafting narratives. The particularity of the continuous perceived existential threat to the nation-
state in Azerbaijan has allowed its government to spread a less complicated narrative of patriotism. 
One does not need to elaborate a sophisticated narrative about the significance of the threat when 
the threat is believed to be obvious. On the contrary, Americans were not confident about the need 
for American participation either in World War I or World War II (at least before the Pearl Harbor 
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attack). The American administrations of the time had to consider people’s lack of interest in 
joining a war in Europe. To get people’s support to conduct wars overseas, American 
administrations had to make them believe that Americans had a responsibility to spread democracy 
and bring peace to the nations of the world. At last, during the 20th century, American 
administrations in their strategic communication targeting domestic audiences had to be more 
creative and persuasive in narratives than Azerbaijani governments were in theirs. 
As a result, the ways in which the governments of the United States and of Azerbaijan 
engage the media in their strategic communication varies as well. The financial independence and 
overall large role of the media in the United States makes possible for the U.S. government to 
engage news outlets only by mutually beneficial agreement. Thus, professional journalists headed 
both the CPI and OWI. Taking the major media’s interests into consideration, some 
administrations integrated its representatives into political teams. This impacted the way in which 
the White House managed to get the media on its side when it was necessary. During times of war 
or military campaigns abroad, American administrations were able to apply military censorship or 
partly limit the media’s capabilities to gather information from the battlefields. Unlike in the 
United States, during the Soviet period, Azerbaijani administrations fully controlled the media. 
The media in Soviet Azerbaijan obediently disseminated the Communist Party’s propaganda 
narratives. Moreover, the Communist Party’s programs for youth, women, and its branches in 
various workplaces controlled further spread of those narratives, such as by organizing discussions 
about particular articles in the press, radio speeches, or TV appearances. The Soviet totalitarian 
control over media was dismantled immediately after Azerbaijan became independent. During 
2001–2005, Azerbaijan adopted legislation about the state’s support to the media. Recently, the 
government has provided journalists in need with free apartments and has declared it is going to 
continue its social programs for the media representatives.365 The government has made it clear 
that it wants the media to be patriotic, which includes its adherence to traditional national values. 
Meanwhile, critics have argued that the government’s social programs aim at mitigating the media 
criticism of the authorities. One of the pioneers of the press in Azerbaijan recently pointed out that 
the lack of commercials and advertising revenue is the most critical problem facing the press in 
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Azerbaijan.366 The limited financial capabilities of the media in Azerbaijan make it more 
dependent on the state’s financial support and influences how easily the government may engage 
the media in domestic propaganda campaigns. Yet this difference is not fixed; with the advance of 
democracy and consequent strengthening of the media in Azerbaijan, the government may want 
to apply the tools of media engagement used by previous U.S. administrations. 
One important difference in the application of strategic communication is related to the 
narratives countering Islamic terrorist propaganda in the United States and Azerbaijan. Unlike in 
Azerbaijan, in the United States Muslims represent a minority of the population. Due to a lack of 
credibility, the U.S. government finds it cannot engage in theological battles with radical Islam.367 
In the United States, the government institutions do not elaborate details of Islamic narratives 
countering radicalization. The American strategy of CVE368 is a larger narrative by itself. By using 
CVE as a larger narrative, the government, through agencies such as DHS, “equips community 
partners” with the information, grants, and other tools to help them identify and counter 
radicalization to violence.369 This mutual trust between government and its community partners 
becomes essential. Accordingly, the strategy principally declares that intelligence and law 
enforcement investigations are not parts of the CVE activities. Although American policy makers, 
legislators, law enforcement, and academics recognize Salafism as the radical ideology that al-
Qaeda and ISIS use to recruit supporters worldwide, American narratives of CVE do not target it 
specifically. Narratives of CVE are complementary to U.S. law-enforcement measures and aim to 
deter legitimate American radicals from progressing to criminal activities of violence. In contrast, 
the Constitution of Azerbaijan prohibits the propaganda of religions “humiliating people's dignity 
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and contradicting the principles of humanism.”370 Nonetheless, administrations in Azerbaijan do 
not oppose radical Salafi ideology either. But given the growing threat of religious radicalization 
as a part of Azerbaijan’s narratives of multiculturalism, the government has defined what 
traditional Islam means and further supported it. Azerbaijan’s government pretends that the 
traditions of peaceful coexistence of the Shi’a and Sunni branches of Islam in Azerbaijan371 are 
the key obstacle to Islamic radicalization in the country. The various governments of Azerbaijan 
have also accentuated the domination of traditions of Shi’a and Sunni branches of Islam372 as parts 
of the narratives countering religious radicalization. 
The aforementioned difference in the respective narratives of the United States and 
Azerbaijan is important also because it conditions how the government's narratives are 
disseminated among different audiences. One of the latest reviewed American policy 
documentsthe congressional hearing of July 2017 related to homegrown extremism 
demonstrates that American policy makers recognize Muslim communities as the key target 
audience for the government’s CVE activities.373 In contrast, Azerbaijan’s multiculturalism 
propaganda presumably targets various domestic audiences. Yet, as discussed earlier, narratives 
anchoring Shi’a or Sunni Islam probably would be better heard either by adherents of those 
branches of Islam, or at least by the audiences not severely radicalized by Salafism. In any case, 
Azerbaijan’s domestic propaganda countering radicalization has a general educative character and 
targets the population of the country as a whole. This difference between narratives requires from 
the two countries application of various approaches in their dissemination. 
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E. POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATION IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 
The threat of terrorism is prevalent in both Azerbaijan and the United States, and therefore, 
despite having different cultural and political contexts, strengthening strategic communication is 
prudent. However, the different resources allocated, different political agendas, as well as different 
legislative and institutional frameworks affect the ways in which both countries might strengthen 
their respective strategic communication. 
Unlike discussions related to strengthening strategic communication that targets an 
international audience, the debate about the domestic realm has not developed as much because of 
the democratic restraints on such an activity. In this section, I discuss the strengthening of domestic 
strategic communication against Islamic radicalization and terrorist recruitment by way of 
improving the institutional framework and narratives of that policy. Even though the United States 
and Azerbaijan vary in their national particulars of strategic communication, there are general 
opportunities that can be used by both to strengthen their policies. 
Strategic communication requires clear direction, coordination, and responsibility.374 In 
both countries, one of the significant gaps in domestic strategic communication countering Islamic 
radicalization is the lack of a single governmental institution responsible for its coordination. In 
the United States, three key institutions, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, the 
FBI’s Office of Partner Engagement, and DHS’s Office for Community Partnerships carry on 
strategic communication in order to counter terrorist recruitment narratives targeting domestic 
audiences. In Azerbaijan, the activities related to countering terrorism are the prerogative of the 
State Security Service, which by publishing reports on terrorist plots and successful investigations 
spreads the instant counterterrorism warning to a general audience. Meanwhile, the government’s 
propaganda countering radicalization is decentralized. The Azerbaijan government develops its 
propaganda by educating the overlapping groups of population, such as youth, sportsmen, women, 
students, and religious and ethnic communities. Consequently, there is variety of governmental 
institutions propagating the government’s narrative countering religious radicalization: The 
Ministry of Youth and Sport, Azerbaijan Youth Foundation, the State Committee for Family, 
                                                 
374 Christopher Paul, Whither Strategic Communication: A Survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2009), 5, https://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP250.html. 
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Women and Children Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the State Committee on Work with 
Religious Associations, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, as well as the government-funded 
NGO the Administration of the Caucasus Muslims.375 The lack of a coordinative institution 
hinders the promotion of consistency and dynamism in countering the quickly evolving threat of 
radical Islam.  
To form a bond, the government has to modify its narratives to the targeted audiences. In 
both the United States and Azerbaijan, there is a need for a comprehensive approach to the 
preparation of narratives countering Islamic radicalization. By definition, federal governments 
have wider organizational and financial capacities in conducting research, defining the context, 
and eventually making effective narratives. One example is the battle between the “just and 
unjust,”376 which is a very widespread narrative for Islamic radicals who claim that they represent 
justice, while their antagonists represent injustice. Meanwhile, the provision of justice is a public 
goodthe realm where governments usually have a lot to communicate. Thus, not only enhancing 
it but also communicating to people the narrative of a state’s provision of justice is natural for a 
government’s domestic strategic communication. Furthermore, another point is to disseminate 
narratives targeting families and close friends of potential terrorist recruits in order to make them 
believe that telling authorities about the radicalization of their loved ones is better than keeping it 
secret.377 Tailoring narratives and stories in accordance with target audiences might also improve 
the effectiveness of strategic communication. Deradicalizing narratives will be of no interest for 
those who are far from becoming a violent extremist; moreover, they even may cause 
annoyance.378 While narratives represent significant tools in a war of ideas, strategic 
communication countering terrorist recruitment requires assiduous work to enhance those 
narratives. 
                                                 
375 In addition to that the government has particular structures addressing issues related to national minorities, 
such as is a Department of Broadcasting of Ethnic Minority Programs in Public Television of Azerbaijan. Their 
activities include propagating among them the narratives of multiculturalism.  
376 Johnson, Taliban Narratives, 275. 
377 Bergen, testimony on Jihad 2.0. 
378 For instance, in 2013, the State Department’s demystifying ISIS campaign “Think Again, Turn Away” 
caused heated public debates triggering sarcasm and skepticism among the non-audience (i.e., people hardly 
interested in joining ISIS).  
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The more ambiguous task for government strategic communication in this regard may be 
not only preventing radicalization of citizens but also disrupting terrorists’ beliefs in order to 
encourage individual disengagement. First of all, narratives of strategic communication countering 
terrorist propaganda might consider addressing ultimate human aspirations, such as justice and 
equality. Governments are capable of presenting stories related to the ends of justice. These 
narratives and stories may correspond with the motivations of some terrorists and make them 
reconsider their choice of participation in terrorist activities. Paul Kamolnick argues that 
“behavioral disengagement from terrorism” 379 rather than merely countering radicalization is a 
more important goal for the United States’ strategic communication. He fairly points out that 
delegitimizing the radical Islamist appeal is possible based on ISIS’s deviation from Islam’s 
definitions of sinners and disbelievers. In this regard, Azerbaijan has noteworthy grounds. 
Traditions of the peaceful coexistence of Shi’a and Sunni adepts of Islam in Azerbaijan fit the idea 
of “resolution of the intra-Islamic sectarian divide” as the way of defeating ISIS’s ideology.380 The 
wider cooperation between governments and scholars of the two countries may help each country 
find the missing elements for strengthening its strategic communication aimed at deradicalization.  
With regard to countering terrorist propaganda, a joint approach of monopolizing the media 
space and acquiring the public trust may strengthen government strategic communication. During 
a war of ideas, the suppression of some information and the exaggeration of other information, as 
well as various framings are conventional techniques. Governments need to coordinate not only 
truthful messages but deceptive ones as well, though with a greater level of caution.381 At the same 
time, media’s self-regulation can help to weaken publicity for terrorists. Moreover, media’s self-
regulation is welcomed in the field of suppression (or framing) of the true information that terrorist 
propaganda can use to elaborate narratives of hatred or relevant stories; after all, certain true stories 
can still motivate the unwelcomed behavior.382 Building on Western media’s reports that can 
                                                 
379 Paul Kamolnick, The Al-Qaeda Organization and The Islamic State Organization History: Doctrine, Modus 
Operandi, and U.S. Policy to Degrade and Defeat Terrorism Conducted in the Name of Sunni Islam, D 101.146:AL 
7/4 (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2017), 180, 
https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo81181. 
380 Kamolnick, The Al-Qaeda Organization and The Islamic State Organization History, 189. 
381 Paul, Strategic Communication, 29. 
382 Johnson, Taliban Narratives, 2. 
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provoke the feelings of Muslims, terrorists may claim that their propaganda is indeed 
educational.383 A consensus between the government and the media is needed with regard to 
reducing the publicity for terrorists and suppressing (or framing) the information terrorists can use 
in their propaganda. Such consensus over better control of the informational realm is hardly 
possible if the media and public distrust the government’s strategic communication. Expanding 
the participation of a civil society, local communities, and volunteers in disseminating counter 
radicalization narratives may result in an increase of public trust and contribute to the overall 
success. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter compared and contrasted the historical development of strategic 
communication in the United States and Azerbaijan, and the application of this policy in 
counterterrorism. Prioritization of freedom of expression was the cornerstone in the organization 
of the domestic-oriented strategic communication in the United States during the 20th century. 
During peacetime, American policy makers, legislators, and presidents have avoided the use of 
strategic communication domestically. Meanwhile, the Azerbaijani analog to strategic 
communication is known as propaganda, and during the 20th century, propaganda targeting 
domestic audiences developed under changing political systems. These political systems 
correspond with two separate periods: that of national independence and the period of Soviet 
totalitarianism. Those controversial periods have left their legacies, affecting the institutional 
framework and narratives of domestic propaganda in Azerbaijan. In both the United States and 
Azerbaijan during various historical periods an existential threat contributed to the success of each 
government’s domestic propaganda campaigns. Finally, the analysis of policy parallels and 
divisions between the two countries highlighted potential opportunities for the United States and 
Azerbaijan to strengthen their strategic communication in countering terrorism, respectively. 
 
                                                 
383 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 20. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The United States and the Republic of Azerbaijan differ in their application of 
strategic communication to counter terrorist recruitment propaganda. Most notably, they differ in 
their stance, or lack thereof, on Islamic concepts and in the audiences targeted by each 
government’s strategic communication. These differences emanate not only from the obvious 
dissimilarity between the countries but also from the various institutional legacies that the 
concept of domestic strategic communication carries. Furthermore, the lessons from how the 
United States deals institutionally with strategic communication to counter terrorist propaganda 
may help Azerbaijan to strengthen the civil society component of the domestic application of 
government propaganda.384  
Generally, this thesis argues for the importance of domestic strategic communication in 
countering terrorist propaganda and recruitment. It recognizes the government’s role in the 
construction of official narratives and in the tailoring of those narratives to specific audiences. The 
definition of narratives is context-dependent, and their meanings are multifold. As mentioned in 
Chapter I, the narrative is most commonly recognized as “an important arsenal of cultural 
ammunition that helps to cultivate doctrine supporting morale and spirit.”385 The second chapter 
of this thesis followed the historical development of the concept and organization of domestic 
strategic communication in the United States from World War I to the War on Terror. The present 
legislative and institutional frameworks of domestic strategic communication in the United States 
incorporate its democratic checks and balances. 
In Chapter III, the research examines the historical development of domestic propaganda 
in Azerbaijan during three periods of its nation-state in the 20th century, each having its particular 
                                                 
384 Unlike in the United States, the term “strategic communication” has no real meaning in Azerbaijan. In the 
context of Azerbaijan, the term təbliğat is used in order to explain the spread of ideas among people. It carries a 
neutral connotation and is most literally translated into English as propaganda or popularization. Government 
institutions of Azerbaijan use təbliğat to describe their promotion of Azerbaijani culture, tourism in Azerbaijan, or 
the propaganda of patriotism among youth. At the same time relative to the propaganda concerning the radical 
religions the term təbliğat is used as well. However, the term propaganda, as a neologism, is sometimes used in the 
Azerbaijani language, and in those very rare cases, it carries the extremely negative meaning. 
385 Johnson, Taliban Narratives, 2–3. 
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legacy. First, the research discusses the ideology and religious propaganda of the First Azerbaijan 
Republic (1918–1920), because its legacy was in the establishment of the narratives of secularism 
and nationalism that underpin contemporary Azerbaijani propaganda. Second, it proceeds to the 
anti-Islam propaganda prevalent during the Soviet era (with a short break during World War II), 
because that period’s legacy had largely enforced the narrative of secularism embedded in 
contemporary Azerbaijani propaganda and affected the institutional framework of strategic 
communication. Third, the research addresses the patriotism propaganda of the independent 
Republic of Azerbaijan after 1991, whose legacy will be the mobilization of popular support for 
the government under the perceived existential threat386 to Azerbaijani nation-statehood, triggered 
by Armenian aggression. By doing this, the thesis follows the emergence of the ideology of 
Azerbaijanism and the narratives of patriotism, multiculturalism, and religious tolerance in the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. Then it looks at how successive governments’ domestic propaganda has 
dealt with alien radical religious ideas that target audiences in Azerbaijan. This thesis advances the 
argument by revealing that the context in Azerbaijan has actually favored its government 
propaganda countering religious radicalization. 
In Chapter IV, by comparing and contrasting the historical development of strategic 
communications in the United States and Azerbaijan and applying this policy in counterterrorism, 
the thesis highlights the weak and strong points in each of the cases. The policy of domestic 
strategic communications in the United States developed during the World Wars of the 20th 
century, and that country has effectively prioritized freedom of expression in its organization. In 
the 21st century, the rise of jihadist propaganda promoting violent extremism has enabled the 
application of strategic communication domestically under several American administrations, 
under a variety of definitions, such as “global engagement,” “community partnership,” and 
“countering violent extremism efforts.” At the same time, in its narratives the United States has 
avoided weighing in on the theological roots of Islamic radicalism. In 2011, its main efforts at 
                                                 
386 The set of perceived existential threats includes Russian-backed Armenian aggression, and Russia, Iran, and 
Armenia warmed up ethnic separatism among minority nationalities residing in Azerbaijan. The three countries have 
organized cooperative activities targeting the Lezgins, Avars, and Talishs of Azerbaijan. From time to time, these 
countries have organized pseudo-scientific conferences, where a few of representatives of Azerbaijani national 
minorities have raised their own cases of irredentism. Even though, ethnic separatism is not popular among the 
Lezgins, Avars, and Talishs residing in Azerbaijan, according to general perceptions, in case of the separation of the 
Armenian populated territories, irredentism may be triggered by the aforementioned three countries in other regions 
of Azerbaijan as well. This eventually would challenge the existence of Azerbaijani nation statehood per se. 
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countering radical Islam and al-Qaeda propaganda on the Internet targeted potential recruits and 
tried to turn them away from joining al-Qaeda. Pursuant the same goal, the National 
Counterterrorism Center disseminated information that was supposed to warn Americans about 
the realities of the terrorists’ recruitment. These educative materials generally have conveyed the 
message that joining terrorists is bad and that American Muslims enjoy their lives in the United 
States. Arguably, these messages resonate with individuals who have not yet been radicalized. The 
messages do not question the rationale of radicalized audiences. 
At the same time, in Azerbaijan during the 20th century, its traditions of propaganda 
targeting domestic audiences developed under two conditionsindependence and Soviet 
totalitarianism. As an independent country, Azerbaijan has faced two separate dimensions of 
religious radicalization, both driven by pro-Iranian Shi’ism and global Salafism. Since the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, successive governments of Azerbaijan have sufficiently contained Iranian 
religious propaganda by supporting their own nationalistic narrative of a unified Azerbaijan, a 
narrative that may resonate with more than 35 million Azerbaijanis in Iran.387 Yet the situation is 
different with regard to the propaganda of Salafism, which presents the potential threat of religious 
extremism and terrorist recruitment. Lately, authorities have paid more attention to countering 
religious radicalization and have recognized the significance of Azerbaijani multiculturalism 
as a set of narratives that may effectively resonate with different groups of people in the country. 
The analysis sheds light upon the fact that even though Azerbaijan has solid foundations for 
narratives countering various vectors of religious radicalization, it needs to strengthen its 
institutional framework in the field of strategic communication targeting domestic audiences to 
counter radical propaganda. 
There are several analyses to be made here. As a result of military operations on the ground, 
al-Qaeda and ISIS have been losing control over their territories and suffering human losses. ISIS 
has expanded its propaganda efforts targeting audiences in countries far from the battleground and 
                                                 
387 There are no exact statistics about how many Azerbaijanis live in Iran. Yet in 2006 Iran’s Ambassador to 
Azerbaijan, Afshar Soleymani, said that their approximate number was about 35 million. The acting supreme 
religious leader of Iran Seyyed Ali Khamenei, as well as large part of Iran’s religious and military elite, are 
Azerbaijanis (see more at: Arif Yunusov, Azerbaijan v Nachale 21 Veka: Konflikti I Potensialnie Ugrozi 
[Azerbaijan in the Early 21st Century: Conflicts and Potential Threats] (Baku: Adiloglu, 2007), 62, 
http://elibrary.bsu.az/books_460/N_418.pdf). 
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taken its terrorist war on infidels to the informational realm. Thus, to secure their nation-states, 
governments need to counter terrorist propaganda, which disseminates radical narratives and 
eventually leads to homegrown extremism. Strategic communication targeting domestic audiences 
might be a proper governmental response to the terrorist threat. Despite the differences in the 
cultural conditions of the United States and Azerbaijan, similarities in the historical application of 
strategic communication, shared values of democracy, and the common threat of Islamic 
extremism imply that there might be common ways the governments of both countries can enhance 
their respective domestic strategic communication to counter terrorist recruitment. 
Arguably, the United States and Azerbaijan, both formally being secular countries, differ 
in their understanding or lack thereof of Islamic concepts. In the United States, the First 
Amendment protects freedom of religion, including the promotion of radical ideas unless they 
advocate for violence. American secularism is focused on the individual’s religious freedom.388 
Furthermore, the United States empowers its moderate local communities, which in turn promote 
the government’s narratives of countering violent extremism. CVE establishes the notion of 
“moderate Islam” that the United States does not define for itself. The straightforward 
understanding of moderate Islam is that it does not appeal to violence (or jihad). It is worth 
mentioning that as the author of an idea of jihad against the United States, Osama bin Laden almost 
defined what moderate Islam is not when he responded to some Saudi scholars who promoted the 
coexistence of the United States and Muslims.389 Using the method of exclusion, moderate Islam 
can be defined as tolerating polytheism and not making judgments about who is Muslim and who 
is not. Very generally, religiously tolerant Muslims may be considered moderate Muslims. 
In contrast, Azerbaijan’s secularism is more complex. On the legislative level Article 18 
of the constitution of Azerbaijan separates religion from the state and education system.390 The law 
“On the Freedom of Religion” requires religious communities register with the government, 
strictly regulates the distribution of religious material, and bans religious propaganda of non-
                                                 
388 Peter Mandaville, Islam and Politics, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 11. 
389 Osama bin Laden considered following the most worrying narratives of jihadism for the West: disavowal of 
polytheism and its supporters, religious struggle-jihad, and excommunication-takfir (see more at: Shiraz Maher, 
Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016], 15). 
390 Portal Azerbaijan.az, “The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”  
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citizens.391 The State Committee on Work with Religious Associations represents the state with 
regard to religion. It is responsible for the safeguarding of religious freedoms and the registration 
of religious communities with the government. At the same time, Article 8 of the law “On the 
Freedom of Religion” defines a special role of the non-state organization Administration of the 
Caucasus Muslims in the coordination of all Muslim religious communities in Azerbaijan. Article 
9 of the law particularly mentions the historical significance of the Administration of the Caucasus 
Muslims as a center of Islam in Azerbaijan. The Administration of the Caucasus Muslims controls 
the mosques, supervises pilgrimages to Mecca, as well as the Shi’a holy sites of Kerbela and 
Mashhad, and provides Islamic education. It finances itself on the basis of voluntary almsgivings 
collected in the mosques. The aforementioned constitutes the legal framework of the state’s 
relation to religion in Azerbaijan. 
At the same time, informally, Azerbaijan’s position relative to Islam anchors its history 
beginning from the first Azerbaijani state of the 16th century.392 It recognizes the historical role of 
the Shi’a and Sunni branches of Islam. Nevertheless, the government’s narratives of 
multiculturalism include supporting Judaism and the traditional branches of Christianity.393 
Furthermore, religious tolerance presumes tolerance toward other branches of Christianity, 
Bahaism, and Krishnaism. Meanwhile, the Administration of the Caucasus Muslims defines 
traditional Islam for Azerbaijan by excluding what is not traditional for Azerbaijan’s Muslim 
population; eventually, Islamic concepts not fitting this logic are not welcomed by the Islamic 
ideology of this country. This difference is a part of the greater dissimilarity between the countries; 
                                                 
391 “Dini etigad azadlighi hagginda Azerbaijan Respublikasinin ganunu” [The law On the Freedom of Religion 
of the Republic of Azerbaijan], E-Qanun, accessed April 26, 2018, http://www.e-qanun.az/framework/7649. 
392 From the 15th century the territory of Azerbaijan had been the arena of conflicts between the Shi’a Safavi 
and the Sunni Ottoman rulers. Yet, the first historical Azerbaijani state in the 16th century was largely formed as a 
result of successful mobilization of Turkic tribes under Shi’a concepts of Islam. Its founder, a Sufi convert to 
Shi’ism, Ismail Safavi, proclaimed Shi’ism the official religion of Azerbaijan in 1501. At the same time, some 
Azerbaijanis followed Sunni Islam. Due to the secular character of Azerbaijan’s statehood, governments have not 
conducted a census specifically corresponding to people’s religious affiliation. According to the data collected by 
the staff of the Presidential Library the most recent ratio between Shi’as and Sunnis is 60–65 percent to 35–40 
percent (see more at: http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a4.html). 
393 This thesis was limited to issues related to Islam. Thus, it did not define which branches of Christianity 
Azerbaijan’s government recognizes as traditional for the country. Yet they do and support Orthodoxy, Catholicism, 
and Protestantism. The mentioned communities operate churches, religious schools, and courses with the 
government’s financial support. At the same time, Azerbaijan demonstrates neutrality regarding the existence of the 
Baptists, Adventists, Pentecostals, and Jehovah’s Witnesses (see more at 
http://multiculturalism.preslib.az/en_a4.html). 
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whereas the United States prioritizes the protection of freedom of expression, Azerbaijan has a 
complex system of protection of its people’s beliefs from the influence of radical ideas. Thus, the 
United States and Azerbaijan promote secularism differently. 
Furthermore, the strategic communication of both countries differs by the population 
groups they target. The traditional Islamic values of Azerbaijan accredited as part of its broader 
concept of multiculturalism have been integrated into Azerbaijani ideology. Various government 
institutions have also promoted multiculturalism in their particular fields of activity, such as youth 
programs, education, and religious communities. The domestic propaganda in Azerbaijan has an 
educational character and addresses all layers of its population, not particular communities or 
individuals. By exercising control over mosques, the Administration of the Caucasus Muslims is 
able to promote the government’s deradicalizing narratives related to Islam, such as a fetwa 
declaring that the Syrian conflict is not a jihad.394 It also conducts educational activities and 
publicizes a monthly magazine promoting traditional Islam. But more importantly, following 
secular authorities, the Administration of Caucasus Muslims annually congratulates all 
Azerbaijanis on the occasion of Nowruzthe main state holiday and festival rooted in pre-Islamic 
polytheism and Zoroastrianism. Since the 16th century, Nowruz has been dear for Shi’as in 
historical Azerbaijan.395 Meanwhile, Salafists in Azerbaijan consider it an apostasy. This 
demonstrates that the Azerbaijani government’s deradicalizing narratives are tailored for 
Azerbaijani audiences and resonate with people who share other narratives of its ideology. 
In contrast, in the United States, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, the 
FBI’s Office of Partner Engagement, and DHS’s Office of Community Partnerships conduct 
strategic communications with the aim of countering terrorist propaganda for recruitment and 
target particular audiences, such as Muslim communities. American policy makers and public 
opinion are cautious about applying wider government informational activities targeting the 
domestic population. Even though this situation derives from the religious dissimilarity between 
                                                 
394 Bayram Balci, Kenan Rovshenoglu, “Shia-Sunni Sectarianism in the Middle East and Its Echo in 
Azerbaijan,” Carnegie Moscow Center, June 27, 2014, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/56032.  
395 Ali Shariati and Mehdi Abedi, Nowruz, Iranian Studies 19, no. 3–4 (September 1986): 237, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00210868608701679. 
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the United States and Azerbaijan, it also suggests the key reason behind the different application 
of strategic communication in countering terrorist recruitment propaganda between the countries. 
The explanation for this difference in the application of strategic communication is rooted 
in the ways in which its policies developed in both the United States and Azerbaijan. Strategic 
communication targeting domestic audiences developed in the United States as an involuntary 
measure; the freedom of expression continuously restrained its application. The World Wars, 
Germany’s propaganda, the Cold War and Soviet propaganda, and eventually Islamic terrorism 
forced American administrations to employ propaganda, more recently branded as strategic 
communication, toward some parts of its population. Therefore, one can fairly call domestic 
strategic communication in the United States a crisis measure. Even though one can call it a 
crisis measure in Azerbaijan as well, the perceived existential threat posed to the nation-state made 
its government’s use of domestic propaganda permanent. Azerbaijan tends to brand its domestic 
propaganda as an educational activity aimed at preserving its population’s original identity. 
Meanwhile, it has become an important tool to mobilize the population for defending its territorial 
integrity or countering religious radicalization. Moreover, the Constitution of Azerbaijan prohibits 
religious propaganda “humiliating people's dignity and contradicting the principles of 
humanism.”396 Accordingly, in Azerbaijan, the government’s authority to educate its population 
in the form of domestic propaganda is natural. Therefore, the difference between both countries is 
that the United States tailors its strategic communication to particular goals during crises, while 
Azerbaijan applies its educational propaganda universally.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The analysis in this research highlights some ideas that can improve the Azerbaijani 
government’s use of propaganda targeting domestic audiences in its effort to disrupt radicalization 
and terrorist recruitment. The research recommends the following to Azerbaijan: 
1. Establish a coordinative intergovernmental institution for developing and 
disseminating propaganda targeting domestic audiences in order to counter 
religious radicalization. The government of Azerbaijan might consider creating 
                                                 
396 Portal Azerbaijan.az, “The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan.”  
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this institution and authorizing it to work with foreign partners, domestic law 
enforcement, think tanks, and the domestic population. Efforts to counter 
religious radicalization on a continuous basis may establish the professional elite 
in the field. It may also contribute to enhancing Azerbaijan’s counterterrorism 
activities. 
2. Undertake the elaboration of narratives based on theological knowledge 
countering the pillars of radicalization for the Azerbaijani context. The 
government of Azerbaijan might consider elaborating its own definition of radical 
Islam and attracting local Islamic scholars to work out narratives compromising 
radical ideas. These narratives have to resonate with the pious Muslims who for 
some reason do not agree with the traditional Islam in Azerbaijan. Tailoring 
narratives to specific audiences can make the messages more powerful. Overall, 
this may help law enforcement in its counterterrorism activities. 
3. Apply a transparent community-based educative approach to government 
propaganda. The government of Azerbaijan might consider engaging its wider 
population to elaborate and disseminate the narratives countering Islamic 
radicalization. It might benefit from the experience of DHS in funding projects 
aimed at the engagement of youth and students in the elaboration of narratives. 
This may work for increasing people’s trust in government domestic propaganda 
countering terrorist recruitment.  
4. Increase the attention given to the deradicalization element of government 
propaganda in counterterrorism. The government of Azerbaijan might consider 
widening its narratives of multiculturalism to tailor them to the members of 
already radicalized communities. Patterns of deradicalization might become 
narratives per se. Tailoring narratives to family members of radicalized 
individuals is one of the possible aspects of this recommendation. In addition to 
that, this approach could mitigate the sense of alienation of radicalized audiences 
have about the state in Azerbaijan. 
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Taking into account these recommendations, Azerbaijan could augment its internal 
capabilities in countering terrorist propaganda for recruitment. The apparent results may be the 
elaboration of strong narratives and stories resonating with various audiences and thus challenging 
the appeal of radical propagandists. Strong narratives and well thought-out media campaigns may 
increase people’s awareness of radicalization. In its turn, the general awareness of Azerbaijani 
society could contribute to family and friends recognizing a target’s potential radicalization early 
and disrupting that progression. While social links sometimes play an important role in an 
individual’s radicalization trusted family and friends may effectively interrupt it in the early stages. 
At the same time engaging wider domestic communities and enhancing their participation in the 
fight against radicalization could contribute to the strengthening of civil society in Azerbaijan. 
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